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    Abstract 
It is an undeniable truism that the world at large and Africa in particular is facing 
serious environmental problems such as deforestation, water pollution, air 
pollution, wetlands destruction, poaching as well as global warming. These 
problems are mainly caused by economic pressure for industrialisation, 
technological advancement, population growth, poverty and ignorance. Efforts to 
tone down these environmental problems have been largely influenced by the 
employment and deployment of Western ethical theories like land ethic, deep 
ecology, ecofeminism and social ecology as well as scientific approaches. Whilst 
these strategies are credited for forming the foundation of environmental 
discourse, they have not been a one-size-fits-all approach. As a result, they have 
registered modicum results in mitigating environmental challenges especially with 
particular reference to Africa. This is simply because they have proved to be 
anthropocentric and they are not flavoured with socio-cultural realities which 
identify the indigenous folk and shape their relationship with the natural 
environment. It is against this backdrop that the researcher feels that African 
communitarianism as a theory embedded on Ubuntu, Indigenous knowledge 
system such as taboos and totems and African traditional religion and morality, 
can chip-in to supply a home-grown solution to African environmental problems. 
Conscious of the pejorative effects of colonial hegemony through Christianity and 
the ever-present modern world of scientific undertakings, the researcher 
recommends a formulation of an environmental ethic that integrates traditional 
African religion, Christian ethics and scientific conservation methods to ensure an 
environmental policy that informs and directs sustainable socio-economic 
trajectory in contemporary Africa.  
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    CHAPTER   ONE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Introduction 
The research project is a critical assessment of African communitarianism for the 
enhancement of environmental well-being. This chapter comprises of background 
to the study, problem statement, research aims and objectives, rationale and   
research methodology. The main purpose of this Chapter is to first provide a brief 
overview of the limitations of traditional Western theories of environmental ethics 
such as land ethic, deep ecology, social ecology and eco-feminism. These theories 
have been largely criticised for being anthropocentric and as a result, till the 
present day, they have not been very significant in the formulation of a policy and 
strategy for the eradication of environmental degradation particularly with special 
attention to Africa. This entails that these theories prioritise the interest of human 
beings other than non-human species of nature. Brennan (2002:2) argues that 
many traditional Western ethical theories are anthropocentric or human centred in 
that they assign intrinsic value to human beings alone. A source of concern 
therefore is that, while these theories fall very short in providing a remedy to 
ecological damage, African and the world’s environment is at auto-cruise speed to 
degradation. Kalemba (2010:54) argues that Africa must respond urgently and 
positively to fight the deforestation and land degradation that add to the problem 
of climate change. In addition, the impact of the pollution caused by the 
industrialised nations constitutes an important threat to Africa and this together 
with deforestation has impacted negatively on the state of the environment on the 
continent. 
 Most of these ecological problems are mainly caused by insatiable economic 
growth, poverty, ignorance, industrialization and technological advancement. In 
Zimbabwe for instance, the violent and disorderly land invasions of year 2000 and 
illegal diamond mining have resulted in huge environmental destruction. During 
this period, wild animals were killed for meat by new farm settlers, trees were cut 
to clear land for agrarian activities as well as to provide firewood for both rural 
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and urban use. Uncontrollable veld fire on new farms was the order of the day 
especially in summer. In South Africa, elephant overpopulation, overgrazing, 
intensive use of pesticides and erosion are some of the major environmental 
problems affecting the country. Writing about overpopulation of elephants in 
South Africa, Brehens (2011:217) pointed out that elephants are herbivores and 
their vast mass requires that they consume enormous quantities of vegetation 
daily to supply their nutritional needs. In the process of foraging they are also 
notoriously destructive, pushing over trees, tearing off bark, and trampling 
smaller plants underfoot. Confined as they are to small areas, breeding 
successfully, they have begun to become a threat to biodiversity and other species 
in their ecosystem. 
Taking into considering these varying and disturbing ecological problems facing 
Africa and the fact that Western ethical methodologies have not provided solution 
to Africa’s ecological problems, it is evident that a new approach is needed and 
that African communitarianism is thus proposed. This proposal emanates from 
two major observations: firstly, the theory is hinged upon African religio-socio-
cultural experience and as a result it is a local solution to local environmental 
problems. Secondly, it is a theory to depend on because its major tenets which are 
religion, morality, holistic approach, the idea of common good, good will, ubuntu 
and harmonious and interdependence relationship with nature make the 
foundation and pillars of African environmental outlook. Illustrating his positions 
on the conciliating relation between humans and the environment in traditional 
African culture, Tangwa cited the instance of his own culture, the Nso in 
Cameroon. For Tangwa, the “Nso attitude toward nature and the rest of creation is 
that of respectful co-existence, conciliation and containment” and he observes that 
there are frequent offerings of sacrifices to God, to the divine Spirits, both 
benevolent and malevolent, to the departed ancestors and to the sundry invisible 
and inscrutable forces of nature (Tangwa, 2006:390). This will expectedly provide 
a reliable foundation to thoughts and policy formulation on African environment. 
Ugwuanyi (2011:05) asserts that African thought and culture have held a theory 
of life itself considerably humanist; one which harbours potential for a form of 
thinking that could spur a people to seek for a man-centred and man desired 
world. This in itself suggests a fertile ground for environmental ethics. What this 
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means is that one cannot try to understand African environmentalism without 
understanding the culture of African people. For instance in African traditional 
religion certain mountains, rivers, forests, trees are considered sacred because 
through them God could communicate to his people, so they are of divine 
significance. The same applies to certain animals. In African traditional society, 
every clan belongs to a particular totem which they identify themselves with. The 
concept of totemism has a bearing on the African people’s environmental 
disposition because one would not kill and eat an animal of his totem. By so 
doing, animals could as well be preserved. Cited in (Mangena, 2013:39), Nyajeka 
argues that the mutupo (totem) principle focuses on fostering the primary 
relationship between animals and humans, animals and the deity, humans and 
humans, deity and humans, nature and humans, the dead and the living. The 
mutupo principle attempts to enumerate and approximate the ideal mode of life 
which assures a sustainable future for all existence. An analysis of fundamental 
elements of mutupo principle reveals that it is a principle which seeks to create a 
cosmology that takes the existence of human entities seriously Nyajeka (1996:12). 
Thus if one’s totem is pig, one cannot therefore eat pig meat and this is meant not 
only to protect pig species from extinction through arbitrary killing for meat but 
also to show that pigs and human beings are related (Mangena, 2013:40). Equally 
significant to the concept of African religion and cultural beliefs in relation to 
environmental ethics is the aspect of taboos especially among the Shona people of 
Zimbabwe. Taboos are part and parcel of the Shona morality and 
environmentalism. Because of their prohibitive nature, they shape human 
behaviour in relation to nature. 
To complement introductory remarks on how African religion and cultural belief 
represent African environmental worldview, this chapter also provides, though 
not in greater detail, ideas of some African environmental ethicist namely 
Tangwa, Ogungbemi and Ugwuanyi. These scholars talk about eco-bio 
communitarianism, ethics of nature relatedness and the articulation of African 
moral principle and traditional practices in relation to environmental ethics 
respectively. Of importance and interests from these ideas is the realisation that 
they are all premised on African communitarianism so together they are calling 
for an environmental ethic from within. 
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1.2. Background to the study 
The researcher has realised that current theories in environmental ethics especially 
of Western origin such as land ethic, deep ecology, social ecology and eco-
feminism, to mention a few, are by and large anthropocentric and just like any 
academic theory, they are fraught with down sides and limitations. This has not 
reduced in a significant way the level of unprecedented environmental 
degradation in Africa and the world at large. For instance, critics of deep ecology 
argue that Naess’ ecology is more than the extended social democratic version of 
utilitarianism which counts human interest in the same calculation alongside the 
interest of all natural things, for example trees, wolves, bears, ants, forest and 
mountains in the natural environment (Witzoszek 2009:78). Furthermore, deep 
ecology has also been criticized by feminists. Plumwood (1991:121) argued that 
the theory of the expanded self is in fact a disguised form of human-indeed 
masculine- egoism, unable to give nature its due respect as a genuine other 
independent of human interest and well-being. Peterson (2013:99) asserts that the 
fourth tenet of deep ecology which states that the flourishing of human life and 
culture is compatible with substantial decrease of the human population is 
completely at odds with reality of population growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. If 
deep ecology were to be applied in the African context, Africans would need to 
adopt a paradigm shift that seems quite impossible: desisting from striving for a 
higher standard of living. Eco-feminism has also been criticized as a theory in 
environmental ethics.  Feldman (1998:91) argued that the problem with eco-
feminism is that the claim that the domination of nature is wrong in the same way 
that the domination of women is wrong makes no sense, since domination can 
only be considered to be unjust when the object dominated has a will.  
The researcher has also observed that African traditional approaches to 
environment which are all enshrined in African communitarianism can provide 
some lessons and ideas that can be used in formulating a much more sustainable 
philosophy of environmental management. But before discussing the connection 
between African communitarianism and environment, the researcher thinks that it 
is of paramount importance to provide a brief conceptualization of African 
communitarianism though the greater part of this concept will be covered in 
Chapter two. African communitarianism refers to the school of thought in which 
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an individual’s identity and role in the society is understood as an integral part of 
the larger community. In this case, the community is considered more important 
than the individual. Among other proponents of African communitarianism are 
Menkiti and Gyekye. In “Person and Community in African Thought” (1984), 
Menkiti argues that, in Africa, the community has priority over the individual. He 
distinguishes between Western views which generally hold that a person is a lone 
individual and African views, in which a person is identified by reference to the 
environing community quoting John Mbiti’s statement “I am because we are, and 
since we are, therefore I am”. According to Menkiti as far as Africans are 
concerned, the reality of communal world takes precedence over the reality of 
individual life histories, thus the communal ethics has ontological and 
epistemological precedence (Menkiti 1984:171). 
Gyekye (2003:42) in his version of moderate communitarianism argues that 
communitarianism sees the individual as inherently communal being, embedded 
in a context of social relationship interdependence. This entails that from a 
communitarianism point of view an individual is not understood as in isolation, 
rather, as he relates and depend on others. What is crucial to note from the 
Gyekye and Menkiti’s articulation of African communitarianism is that an 
individual is “inherently a communal being embedded in a context of social 
relationships of interdependence”. It is not an exaggeration to say that the 
community in this case refers to both of human beings, animals, plants and non- 
living things of the natural world. If this is the case, then it is therefore safe to 
argue that it is through, traditional African religion, the idea of common good, 
holistic approach, co-operation, goodwill, consensus, and totemism and taboos 
that an African environmental consciousness is hinged and reflected. 
Chemhuru and Masaka (2012:121) assert that taboos (zviera) form an integral part 
and parcel of the Shona morality. Among Shona people of Zimbabwe, 
environmental taboos have a pivotal moral role towards the ontological wellbeing 
of both the individual person and the environment at large. Prohibitions and 
restrictions through taboos on unsustainable use of certain plant species, forests, 
mountains, rivers, pools and nonhuman animals, among other ecological species 
in the ecosystem, is not a new epistemology among the Shona people, but reflects 
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a long tradition. At the same time, they are currently very lively and continue to 
shape Shona environmental ethics (ibid). 
Tatira (2000:13) rightly notes that, “the Shona people realise the importance of 
preserving the environment as a factor in overall development. This knowledge is 
manifested in some of the taboos that control child behaviour in relation to the 
environment”. Writing about the relationship between Shona taboos and the 
environment, (Chemhuru & Masaka, 2010:127) argues that another taboo that 
discourages the abuse of water sources is ukawetera munvura, unozorwara 
nechirwere chehozwe, which means “if you urinate in water source, you will 
suffer from bilharzias”. In this taboo, fear of contracting a disease is used as a 
deterrent for those who may be tempted to urinate in water sources thereby 
polluting them. Therefore this taboo implicitly teaches people to act in a way that 
is compatible with the pursuit for a liveable environment even though fear of 
contracting a disease is used as a deterrent. Thus the taboo is coined in order to 
foster environmental awareness among the Shona (Chemhuru and Masaka, 
2010:127). In this regard, Tangwa (2006) notes that, “as human beings, we carry 
the whole weight of moral responsibility and obligation for the whole world on 
our shoulders”  Thus, Shona taboos are ethical tools that do not only foster good 
human relations but also promote good relations between human beings and 
nature. 
 Segun Ogungbemi defines African environmental ethics as the “ethics of nature 
relatedness” (Mangena 2013:30). For Ogungbemi, the ethics of nature relatedness 
can be succinctly stated as ethics that lead human beings to seek to co- exist 
peacefully with nature and treat it with some reasonable concern for its worth, 
survival and sustainability (ibid). Ogungbemi (1997:208) argues that in traditional 
Africa, man recognizes the importance of water, land and air management. The 
ethics of care is extended to the understanding of environmental protection, 
conservation and management in Africa. Ogungbemi further postulates that in the 
traditional communities, the ethics of not taking more than you need from nature 
is a moral code (ibid). Perhaps this explains why earth, forests, rivers and wind 
and other natural objects are traditionally believed to be both natural and divine. 
The philosophy behind belief may not necessarily be religious but a natural means 
by which the human environment can be preserved.  
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According to Mangena (2013:31), in defining African environmental ethics, 
Godfrey Tangwa argues that within the traditional African metaphysical 
worldview, the dichotomy between “plants, animals, and inanimate things; 
between the sacred and the profane, matter and spirit, the communal and the 
individual, is a slim and flexible one.” For Tangwa this metaphysical worldview 
involves the “recognition and acceptance of interdependence of and peaceful 
coexistence between earth, plants, animals and humans” (Tangwa, 2006:389). 
This metaphysical outlook underpinned the ways, manner and cosmically 
relations between human and his fellow humans. It is also responsible for why 
traditional Africans were more cautious in their attitude plants and the various 
invisible forces of the world (ibid). His environmental theory is significant to the 
research because it reflects the interdependence of and peaceful co-existence 
between earth, plants and humans in the pre-colonial traditional African society. 
 Ugwuanyi articulates on the moral principles of the world and how it suggests an 
idea of environmental ethics and locates philosophy that interprets traditional 
religious practices and the environmental principles that could be derived there-in. 
For him, morality in Africa is grounded in a form of communitarianism which is a 
theory of shared identity and good will. From communitarianism flow Africa’s 
core values: co-operation, consensus, reconciliation and commonality (Ugwuanyi, 
2011:10). Based on this claim, he declares that a relationship with the 
environment that generates discord or factions among humanity cannot be 
permitted by the African moral principle of communitarianism. 
The aspect of totemism among African cultural beliefs also has a bearing on the 
environmental disposition and outlook. For Murove, totemism shows 
characteristics of the Bantu mind: The strong tendency to give a human soul to 
animals, to plants, to nature as such a tendency which is at the very root of the 
most beautiful blossoms of poetry, a feeling that there is community of substance 
between the various forms of life (Murove, 2004:201-202). Chivaura shares the 
same plate of opinion with Murove when he asserts that, the adoption of totemism 
in African world-view such as the leopard, lion, elephant, crocodile, hippo, fish, 
python or eagle is to prevent people from destroying animals or flora and fauna 
they identify with as totems. Killing anything adopted as a totem becomes an 
offence (Chivaura, 2005:235). 
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Central to African communitarianism is African traditional religion. Traditional 
African religion as an element of culture depicts environmental consciousness. 
Mbiti argues that in African religion God, spirits, humanity and non-humans exist 
as a unity, and to break that unity is to destroy one or more of the modes of 
existence, and to destroy one of them is to destroy them all (Mbiti, 1969: 51). This 
entails that among African traditional societies, there is a strong connection 
between God, the living, the dead and the environment. This kind of 
interdependence and connectedness is very foundational in as far as the 
conception of African environmental ethics is concerned.  Nyamiti shares this 
understanding when he concludes that the universe is a sort of organic whole 
composed of supra-sensible or mythical core relations or participation (Nyamiti, 
1973:21). Magesa asserts that the African world is the manifestation of God, His 
power, and benevolence. Accordingly, a big rock where people go to sacrifice is 
not just a big rock but it incorporates, shows, and for that reason is, in fact some 
supernatural quality of the divine. The same can be said of practically anything 
that inspires awe: mountains, trees, snakes, certain animals and so on. While 
African religion understands that these elements are by no means God but 
creatures, it also recognises that they have divinity in them because they exist by 
the will and through the power of divinity. In a sense, they exit by the will and 
through the power of the divinity and they represent the divinity and surely 
demonstrate God’s will and power to humanity (Magesa, 1997:14) 
Still on African traditional religion and African environment, Peterson (2013) 
argues that Ugwuanyi’s basis for claiming that traditional philosophy and religion 
are a third source of environmental ethics is the observation that for traditional 
Africans, religion is a “complete way of life”. African religion is not textually 
preserved- rather it is captured everywhere through myth, songs, dance, painting, 
carving, adages, symbols, sculptures and languages. Lending support to the notion 
of environmental communitarianism, the practice of traditional religion itself is 
communal. The individual is identified with the religion of his community 
(Ugwuanyi, 2011:7). This therefore entails that if one is identified with the 
religion of the community he or she cannot afford to go against the dictates and 
expectations of the entire society, be it environmental, social and religious. An 
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individual cannot go and cut trees from a forest which is considered to be sacred 
by the whole community. 
Maathai, a Kenyan environmentalist and founder of the Green Belt Movement 
postulates that, I saw how important culture was to the larger goals of the Green 
Belt Movement and to managing our natural resources efficiently, sustainably and 
equitably. Many aspects of the cultures of our ancestors practiced had protected 
Kenya’s environment (Maathai, 2007:175). From this idea one can learn that 
culture in African society is an indispensable element if ever there should be 
serious and practical environmental policy, ethic and strategy. 
 Paying attention to the above discussion one can deduce that, African 
communitarianism in particular is a rich theoretical concept that can be used as a 
resource to formulate a sustainable philosophy to enhance environmental well-
being. This observation has motivated the researcher to embark on a study that 
unpacks the philosophical richness or grounded-ness of African 
communitarianism with the view of gaining ideas that can be used in the 
development of a sustainable approach. The researcher believes that current 
environmental ethical theories are inadequate and a new theory is needed and that 
the ethos of African communitarianism such as the collective approach, African 
religion, African morality, the idea of common good can supply the required 
ingredients. 
1.3. Rationale 
The proposed research is considered philosophically important because: 
Firstly, it seeks to answer the question: What should be done to develop an 
environmental ethic that is anchored in African communitarianism to solve 
African environmental challenges? By so doing, the proposed research is 
pragmatic. According to Light (1996:84) environmental pragmatism is a new 
strategy in environmental thought which argues that theoretical debates are 
hindering the ability of the environment movement to forge agreement on basic 
policy imperatives. This new direction in environmental thought moves beyond 
theory, advocating a serious inquiry into the merits of moral pluralism (ibid). This 
therefore means that this research project strives to augment efforts to solve 
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problems of environmental crisis by resorting to African communitarianism as an 
alternative approach.  
Secondly, this research seeks to provide an alternative approach to environmental 
ethics. While credit is given to Western approaches and schools of thought on 
environmental ethics, however it has been noted that some if not most of them are 
anthropocentric in nature. Brennan (2002:2) argues that many traditional Western 
ethical theories are anthropocentric or human centred in that they assign intrinsic 
value to human beings alone. This means that they put priority to the interest of 
humans only other than attaching inherent value to the environment as well. This 
implies that there is definitely a need for a sustainable ethic which is not only 
anthropocentric, hence the proposal of an environmental ethic anchored on 
African communitarianism. Why African communitarianism? Because it is a 
theory that reflects African thought, it is hinged on aspects such as the holistic 
approach, African traditional religion, African morality, the idea of common 
good, respect for nature and more importantly the interdependence and 
harmonious relationship between Africans and nature. Tangwa (2006:389) argues 
that within the African worldview, the distinction between plants, animals, and 
inanimate things, between the sacred and the profane, matter and spirit, the 
communal and the individual is a slim and flexible one. For instance the belief 
that humans in certain circumstance can transform into animals and plants or into 
plants and forces such as wind is very prevalent within this system and has very 
significant implications for the way nature is approached. Mkenda also postulates 
that, in the traditional African culture, the human being was not isolated from 
nature. Human being as a creature of God was part of the whole creation. Though 
the human being was regarded as part of nature, the Africans traditionally viewed 
him as the centre of the universe. Everything in the universe exists in relation to 
human beings (Mkenda, 2010:2). However, it has to be noted that the fact that 
traditional African societal setting puts human beings at the centre of the universe 
does not mean it is very anthropocentric because the underlining concept is 
harmonious and interdependence relationship between human beings and nature. 
Thirdly, this research can lead to the development of a sustainable environmental 
theory which can be used to direct environmental policies and laws for 
environmental management. Furthermore, knowledge to be gained can go a long 
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way in helping different stakeholders in environmental management be it 
students, non-governmental organizations as well as government ministries in 
Africa and other nations by way of providing ideas and techniques on how certain 
environmental issues are grappled with. More importantly, this research can also 
trigger questions which may require further investigations and this is very 
important in the expansion of knowledge in the fields of environmental 
philosophy and environmental management.  
Fourthly, by advocating for an environmental ethic anchored on African 
communitarianism, the researcher seeks to consolidate and defend the existence 
of African Philosophy, a once controversial and contested knowledge arena. The 
African continent has been considered as a continent without a philosophy and 
civilization. Ugwuanyi (2011) noted that modernity in the Western notion of it 
which has strong influence in several parts of the world has harboured 
provocative ideas which do not capture the idea of man in Africa. Arising from 
this, African world view has been ignored in the formation of relevant theories in 
philosophy. This state of affairs can be said to be as old as the enlightenment 
period of Western philosophy (ibid).  
In addition, Kelbessa (2005:19-20) postulates that despite the fact that advances 
have been made through recent discourses on the environmental concern of non- 
Western traditions most of the related research has centred on Asia, Native 
American Indians and Australian Aborigines, with little attention being paid to 
most of Africa. Those who have studied non- Western religions and philosophies 
have overlooked the contribution of Africa to environmental ethics. They have 
either kept quiet or what they said about Africa was rather thin compared to what 
they said about Native Americans, Asians and Australian Aborigines. This 
therefore entails that special attention regarding environmental ethics has not been 
rendered to the African continent despite the existence of people with a culture, 
land, forests, mountains, rivers and animals in the very continent. 
 Furthermore, Peterson postulates that the articulation of an African 
environmental ethic is therefore crucial for two reasons: first, Africa’s 
environment is in qualitative unique crisis, one that must be considered with 
exactitude to its context. Second, even with globalization and the creation of 
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“global village” Huntington’s clash of civilization thesis still holds in support of 
the notion that we are not “one world” (Peterson, 2013:100). As a result, a unique 
African environmental philosophy is necessary to define how Africans ought to 
live in relation to environment because an African environmental ethic is the 
moral canvas upon which Africa itself may advance its own response to African 
ecological problems and in turn address its role in deforestation and climate 
change (ibid). It is against this background that the researcher found it 
philosophically important to suggest the possibility of an environmental ethic 
anchored on African communitarianism to send a louder philosophical message to 
the entire world that Africans like any other race have the capacity to come up 
with ideas to enhance environmental well-being through indigenous cultural 
experiences and knowledge avenues such as communitarianism. 
Apart from contributing to the field of environmental ethics, the researcher wants 
contribute to the development of African moral thought. This is so because the 
researcher cannot give a successful critical assessment of African 
communitarianism without taking into consideration the African moral concept. 
For Gyekye (1998) morality in Africa is grounded in a form of communitarianism 
which to a larger extent is a man centred ideology. Metz (2007) puts it that an 
action is right insofar as it promotes a shared identity among people grounded on 
good-will; an act is wrong to the extent that it fails to do so and leads to 
encourage the opposite of alienation and ill-will.  According to Brehens (2011:08) 
African philosophy for many reasons, ranging from the historical denigration of 
African culture by others, to colonial hegemony to racist and politicized accounts 
of Africa to the oral, non- literate nature of traditional African thought and so on 
has been relatively slow in its development. Nonetheless, it has made great strides 
especially in establishing itself as a field with its own voice, perspective and 
contribution to make to the academy. 
The researcher also seeks to challenge the idea that African environmentalism is 
anthropocentric. Callicott argues that, apparently Africa looms as a big blank spot 
on the world map of indigenous environmental ethics for a very good reason. 
African thought orbits; seemingly around human interests hence one might expect 
to distil from it no more than a weak and indirect environmental ethic, similar to a 
type of ecologically enlightened utilitarianism, found on long-range human 
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welfare (Callicott 1994:158). The researcher has learnt that scholars who hold the 
claim that African environmentalism is anthropocentric derive their conclusion 
from the works of some African philosophers. For instance, Brehens (2011:52) 
argues that Mbiti s work on African religion has also been used to claim the 
anthropocentric nature of African thought. Because man thinks of himself as 
being at the centre, he consequently sees the universe from that perspective. It is 
as if the whole world exists for man’s sake. Therefore African people look for the 
usefulness (or otherwise) of the universe to man. This means both what the world 
can do for man and how man can use the world for his own good (Mbiti 1975:38). 
More to that, another aspect of African thought and worldview that has been 
accused for being anthropocentric in as far as environmental ethics is concerned is 
ubuntu. Cited in Brehens (2011:51), Horsthemke suggest that ubuntu is by 
definition anthropocentric and any attempt to expand ubuntu to embrace respect 
for the environment would have to ground concern for nature in terms of its 
usefulness to humans. 
However, the researcher thinks that the above assertion that indigenous African 
environmentalism is anthropocentric was made without a critical appreciation and 
understanding of African religion, ontology and the general communitarian way 
of life with relationship to nature. This is because the African notion of Ubuntu 
promotes environmental well-being. For instance Mkenda asserts that, the 
Akamba people of Kenya define mundu (a person) according to his relation to 
nature and others. One has to co-exist peacefully with other people, other living 
being and inanimate beings within his or her environment. Good acts are those 
that keep harmony and peace in the web of relationship within the community 
(Mkenda, 2010:4). Bujo argues that, the African is convinced that all things in the 
cosmos are interconnected. All natural forces depend on each other so that human 
beings can live in harmony only in and with the whole of nature (Bujo, 1998:22-
23).  Murove reiterates that traditional African ethics in general recognized the 
intimate bond between men and their environment, the debt that the members of 
any generation owe to their forebears, and their consequent responsibility to 
posterity (Murove, 2004:195). Opoku argues that in Africa there is community 
with nature since man is part of nature and is expected to cooperate with it, and 
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this sense of community with nature is often expressed in terms of identity and 
kinship, friendliness and respect (Opoku, 1973:77). 
Kelbessa is one of the philosophers who contributed notably in disputing the view 
that African environmental world-view is anthropocentric. In his study of the 
Oromo people of Ethiopia, he found that, the moral code of the Oromo people 
does not allow irresponsible and unlimited exploitation of resources and human 
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flects deep respect and balance between various things. The Oromo do not simply 
consider justice, integrity and respect as human virtues applicable to human 
beings but they extend them to nonhuman species and mother earth (Kelbessa, 
2005:24). 
1.4. The Statement of the problem 
The problem to be investigated is how the doctrine of African communitarianism 
can be of use in the development of an authentic ethic for environmental 
management in Africa and beyond. Questions that will guide the whole process 
are: (i) what are the fundamental assumptions underlining the doctrine of African 
communitarianism? (ii) What are the main strengths and weaknesses of African 
communitarianism as a philosophy in enhancing environmental well-being?  (iii) 
In what way can the doctrine of African communitarianism close existing 
epistemological gaps in the contemporary discourse on environmental ethics? 
Environmental depletion of both flora and fauna is one of the major problems 
affecting contemporary Africa. Mabogunje (1998:05) argued that Sub-Saharan 
Africa suffers from environmental problems including deforestation, soil erosion, 
desertification, wetland degradation and insect infestation. Efforts to deal with 
these problems however have been handicapped by a failure to understand their 
nature and possible remedies. Ugwuanyi (2011:1) asserts that the reason for 
engaging on African environmental debate arises from the growing threat of 
environment as an aspect of humankind that needs theoretical and practical 
solution. From the researcher’s view, environmental problems might be caused by 
insatiable desire for economic growth, industrialization, urbanization, population 
growth, technological advancement, poverty and ignorance. For Zimbabwe in 
particular, the land reform program, diamond mining and other socio-economic 
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undertakings pose serious environmental problems. Scoones, Marongwe and 
Mavedzenge (2010:88) postulate that the Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe 
resulted in the destruction of the natural environment. Veld fires expanded 
massively following the resettlement. There was extensive hunting of game in the 
area and trees were cut to clear fields for farming and to sell firewood for urban 
dwellers. This was a clear defiance of policy on the part of government and 
knowledge from villagers. Further degradation of the land comes from illegal gold 
mining, most of them are people who have been resettled and who have found it 
difficult to produce on farms. Thus the years 2000-2005 have seen a gradual 
resurfacing of deserts on most farms along highways in Zimbabwe piles of dry 
wood are common sight Makanyisa, Chemhuru and Masaka 2012:181).  
Furthermore, writing about overpopulation of elephants in South Africa Brehens 
states that, elephants are herbivores, and their vast mass requires that they 
consume enormous quantities of vegetation daily to supply their nutritional needs. 
In the process of foraging they are also notoriously destructive, pushing over 
trees, tearing off bark and trembling smaller plants underfoot. Most wildlife 
management experts maintain that unless their numbers are curtailed, elephants 
are capable of doing substantial and even irreparable damage to the ecosystem the 
currently inhabit. Brehens (2011:217). Equally disturbing are the environmental 
threats posed by Global Climate Change. This has become one of the most topical 
environmental ethics issues of our time. There are growing concerns about the 
effects of continued increase in global temperatures over the next few decades. 
Climate models suggest that even a moderate further increase in temperature 
could have catastrophic results for humankind as well as other aspects of nature 
(ibid). Kalemba (2009) argues that Democratic Republic of Congo as one of  
Africa’ s counties should fight  to protect the existence of tropical forests under 
threat from industry because it is estimated that 40 percent of Congo’s forest will 
be lost in the next forty years if nothing is done now. Consequently, it is 
justifiable that there is a search for a sustainable African oriented philosophical 
solution to address environmental problems. 
 In addition, studies have depicted that since the inception of environmental ethics 
as a sub discipline of Philosophy in the 1970s, it has been largely understood from 
a Western perspective hence anthropocentric. For example, White (1967:7) argues 
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that the main strands of Judeo-Christian thinking had encouraged the 
overexploitation of nature by maintaining the superiority created of humans over 
all other forms of life on earth and by depicting all of nature as created for the use 
of humans. Because of this Western orientation, earlier theories on environmental 
ethics such as deep ecology, land ethic, social ecology as well as eco-feminism 
could not  provide a lasting solution to solve environmental problems affecting 
African and non-African societies. This brings up and justifies the idea of having 
an environmental philosophy, strategy and policy anchored on African 
communitarianism to salvage rampant environmental crisis. 
1.5. Research Aims  
The researcher aims to: 
i. Find out how African communitarianism as a philosophy can be 
used to develop an environmental ethic that enhances 
environmental well-being in Africa. 
ii. Make a contribution to the expansion of knowledge in the field by 
providing supplementary pedagogical literature on environmental 
philosophy for students, readers and other environmental 
stakeholders. 
iii. Provide philosophical and theoretical ideas for practical policies 
and solutions to environmental problems affecting Zimbabweans, 
Africans and the world at large. 
iv. Demonstrate the idea that African philosophy is a competitive 
knowledge area that can supply us with very useful knowledge 
items that we can use to direct development in Africa and beyond 
particularly solving environmental problems. 
 
1.6. Research Objectives 
i. To critically examine the fundamental assumptions underlining the 
doctrine of African communitarianism. 
ii. To examine the main strengths and weaknesses of African 
communitarianism as a philosophy in enhancing environmental 
wellbeing. 
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iii. To adopt the doctrine of African communitarianism and use it to 
close existing knowledge gaps in the contemporary discourse on 
environmental ethics in an effort to come up with an authentic tool 
for environmental management in Africa and beyond. 
1.7. Methodology 
To come up with a successful research project, the researcher shall conduct the 
research through qualitative research design and philosophical analysis. The 
researcher prefers qualitative because it enables an in depth understanding of a 
phenomenon. Qualitative research methods were developed in the social sciences 
to enable researchers to study social and cultural phenomena (Myers 1997:12). 
Philosophical analysis has to do with a critical and reflective conceptualization of 
the phenomenon under study (Schofield 1982:31). This means that the researcher 
will critically analysis and evaluate the African notion of communitarianism and 
environmental ethics as they are contained in both primary and secondary texts. 
This implies that the researcher will critically read, analyse and reflect on 
journals, articles, magazines, textbooks and any relevant literature on African 
communitarianism and environmental ethics. 
 
1.8. Conclusion 
In this introductory chapter, the researcher has argued that the proposal to have 
communitarianism as an alternative approach to environmental discourse and 
management  emanates from the observation that Africa is exposed to rampant 
environmental problems caused by industrialisation, economic growth, ignorance 
and poverty  just to mention a few. Zimbabwe’s violent land reform programme 
of year 2000 for example caused serious environmental problems. The researcher 
has also find out that the idea that current theories in environmental ethics such as 
land ethic, deep ecology, social ecology, eco-feminism and others are fraught with 
shortfalls and they have not significantly contributed to the eradication of 
environmental degradation in Africa and beyond hence the need for an indigenous 
socio-cultural remedy. As a result the researcher is of the view that the ethos of 
African communitarianism can provide the much more needed formula in coming 
up with an environmental ethic that can be depended on in environmental 
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management and environmental philosophy. This means that the major tenets of 
African communitarianism which are religion and culture, morality, holistic 
approach, the idea of common good, the harmonious and interdependence 
relationship with nature are examined side by side with environmental ethics. The 
researcher has also managed to show how taboos and the aspect of totemism 
represent African environmentalism. Why African communitarianism? Because it 
is an approach which is quite different from western approaches in the sense that 
it is grounded in African religious and cultural experiences. Attention has also 
been made to the contributions of Tangwa, Ogunbemi and Ugwuanyi to African 
environmentalism noting that the trio’s environmental philosophies are by and 
large microcosm of the macrocosm of an environmental ethic anchored on 
African communitarianism. 
 
The next Chapter discusses the concept of African communitarianism as espoused 
by Placide Tempels, John Mbiti, Ifeanyi Menkiti, Kwame Gyekye and Masolo. 
The conceptualisation of African communitarianism is important in providing a 
framework upon which an African environmental ethic can be anchored. 
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 CHAPTER TWO 
2. CONCEPTUALISATION OF AFRICAN COMMUNITARIANISM 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter seeks to provide a conceptualisation of African communitarianism as 
espoused by Tempels, Mbiti, Menkiti, Gyekye and Masolo. It is fundamental to 
indicate at this initial stage that the main thrust of this chapter is to discuss how 
the concept of the person in relation to the community is understood by the above 
mentioned philosophers. However, I have reserved the criticism of these scholars’ 
views on the understanding of the person for Chapter Four. 
Through his thesis of vital force, Placide Tempels takes force to be central to all 
Bantu way of life. In his conception of a person, he holds that Bantu people is a 
living force, a supreme force that was created and called by God to participate in 
his creation as the most powerful among created beings. For Tempels Bantu 
people as vital force, needs to engage in relation with his surrounding 
environment of supernatural world, fellow human beings and inanimate things 
Tempels (1959:67). It is through this interaction that the Bantu people find their 
place and space in the communitarian society. Tempels further argues that 
observing moral rules and achievement of moral worth is a pre-requisite for the 
Bantu people to be recognised in a communitarian society. A person who is not 
moral was considered to be of no importance to the community. 
Taking the discourse from Tempels, Mbiti also discusses the place of the 
individual in the African context. Mbiti starts by showing that in the traditional 
African thought individuals belong to different tribal group. For Mbiti these tribal 
groups have distinct religious system with which they identify themselves with 
(Mbiti 1970:135). Found in these tribes is the aspect of kinship which regulates 
the life of all members. Through kinship, the relationship among Africans is 
found among the living, the dead and the yet to be born. 
Mbiti argues that in traditional life, there is no isolated individual. A person needs 
other members of the community. The individual owes his existence to other 
people including those of past generations and his contemporaries. The 
community must therefore, create or produce their individual. Mbiti argues that 
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physical birth is not enough; the child must go through rites of incorporation so 
that it becomes fully integrated into the entire society. These rites continue 
throughout the physical life of the person, during which the individual passes 
from one stage of corporate existence to another (Mbiti 1970:35). Mbiti argues 
that whatever happens to the individual happens to the whole group and whatever 
happens to the whole group happens to the individual. The individual can only say 
“I am because we are; and since we are, therefore I am”. This is a cardinal point 
in the understanding of the African view of human person (ibid). 
Like Mbiti, Menkiti holds that the conception of the person in the traditional 
African thought involves a definition of a person by the environing community 
other than mere physical or psychological characteristics. For Menkiti the concept 
of personhood cannot be reduced to the Cartesian cogito ego sum Menkiti 
(1984:170). Menkiti argues that the reality of the community world takes 
precedence over the reality of individual life histories. Without the community, 
the individual cannot be. The community for Menkiti takes epistemic and 
ontological precedence over the individual (ibid). For personhood to be attained 
an individual has to go through a long process of social and ritual transformation. 
Furthermore, for Menkiti the community has got a role in prescribing certain 
norms to the individual. These moral prescriptions are very important in nurturing 
the individual to become fully person who is accepted by the community. In 
Menkiti’s view personhood is attained and as such one can fail to attain 
personhood. 
Gyekye’s version of communitarianism is different from Mbiti and Menkiti. 
Matolino (2008:75) postulates that Gyekye accuses both philosophers for failing 
to accommodate the rights and freedom of individuals within the community. 
Accordingly Gyekye regarded Mbiti and Menkiti’s version as radical and 
philosophically indefensible. In his moderate communitarianism Gyekye 
(1997:49) views the community as a reality in itself and not as a mere association 
of individuals. He however stresses that individual capacities should be 
recognised for they define who a person is. But he carefully concedes that these 
capabilities should be realised within the context of a community. 
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At the heart of Gyekye’s version of moderate communitarianism lie aspects such 
as the common good, community of mutuality, the principle of reciprocity,  an 
ethic of responsibility and the concept of rights. These aspects together contribute 
to an understanding of a person in the traditional African thought. 
Masolo is also another African philosopher who has contributed significantly to 
the concept of African communitarianism. Masolo (2010:231) argues that Negro-
African society puts more stress on the group than on the individual, more on the 
solidarity than on the activity and needs of the individual, more on the 
communion of persons than on their autonomy. 
According to Masolo (2010:241) knowledge of communitarian values is passed 
on to individuals at crucial points in their growth and development from 
childhood to adulthood. This is done both systematically through well-defined 
procedures and randomly in the course of everyday life where people learn from 
the examples of others, from various modes of speech (such as orders, com-
mendation and praise, criticism and rebuke, and proverbs and stories), and from a 
person’s participative learning when he or she is asked to perform certain duties 
or is shown how to do normal things of life in some very specific ways. 
Bujo (1990:95) asserts that in an African traditional setting, there is no individual 
human being without the community and the community is a communion of 
individuals. For Bujo, an African person whose acting and thinking is always in 
solidarity and almost identical with his or her tribal community is nonetheless 
able to make an ethical, responsible decision as an individual (ibid). 
Bujo (2003:95) postulates that the fact that individuality is inseparable from the 
communitarian nature of human existence in an African society implies that every 
person has to contribute to the well-being of the community. It is from this 
contribution that the individual is recognised as having such significance in that 
very community. 
2.2. Placide Tempels on African communitarianism 
Placide Tempels in his discussion of the understanding of a person in the African 
traditional thought, he wrote the work entitled Bantu Philosophy which many 
African scholars in particular reject. Although his work was taken as 
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controversial, it is considered to be the foundational work on the African 
conception of a person upon which other Philosophers especially Mbiti construct 
their arguments concerning the issue. Deacon cited in Coetzee and Roux 
(2002:110) argues that the provocative and revolutionary nature of Tempels work 
did not go down well with the colonial powers in Congo, hence his banishment 
from Congo by the Colonial administration and the Catholic Church. Tempels 
takes force to be central to all Bantu schemes of things. “Vital force, increase of 
force and vital influence are the three great notions which we shall find necessary 
at the base of Bantu psychology. It is on this plan that we wish to pursue this part 
of our study” Tempels (1959:64). 
For Tempels Bantu human person is a living force. The human being was 
supreme force that has dominion over other created things and he had been called 
by God to share and participate in his creation through the exercise of this 
divinely granted force. A human being in this view is not a mere living being, but 
the ultimate expression of the fullness of life. The Bantu see in a human being the 
living force, the force or the being that possesses life that is true, full and lofty. A 
human being is the supreme force, the most powerful among created beings. 
Human beings dominate plants, animals and minerals (ibid). The credit Tempels 
get from this notion is that he managed to depict that Africans are a people with a 
culture, are religious people and that they possess a complete way of life. As a 
non-African, like other missionaries, colonisers and some Western thinkers, 
Tempels could have written denying religion and civilization among the Africa 
people. For instance, Coetzee and Roux (2002:109) wrote “it is hardly to be 
believed that God who is a wise being should place a soul, especially a good soul 
in such a Black and ugly body”. This notion belittles and disconnects the Black 
people from their Supreme Being, rendering them as a people without a religion. I 
find this denigrating. Hume also wrote “I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be 
naturally inferior to the whites .There never was civilized nation of any other 
complexion than the white, nor even any individual eminent in action or 
speculation. No indigenous manufacturer among them, no arts, no sciences…. 
Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so many countries 
and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction betwixt these breeds of 
men” Emevwo Biakolo, in Coetzee and Roux (1998:2). So, by portraying the 
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African people as having a way of life Tempels was accused of committing 
intellectual offence. Deacon as cited in Coetzee and Roux (2002:110) argues that 
if the African was recognised as having a “philosophy”, the African could by 
repercussion be said to have civilisation as cited. This notion presented a threat to 
the superiority of the European, as justified by enlightenment philosophy as well 
as to the economics of the colonial mission. This entails that granting a 
philosophy to Africans would mean that Africans are more or less equal to 
Europeans and this would not provide justification for colonialism. 
 
Cited in Matolino (2008:56) Tempels argued that Bantu ontology admitted that 
one should be able to grow, increase his force at every turn, becoming greater and 
stronger or even more successful. But Matolino recognised that this growth was 
not an endless process. He noted that Bantu thought also admitted that one’s vital 
force could be completely lost, either gradually or suddenly. In his own words 
‘man’ can come to an end in complete annihilation of his very essence, the 
paralysis of his vital force, which takes from him the power to be an active force 
Tempels (1959:66). This means death. If one dies according to Tempels he loses 
his vital force and he depends on the living to renew it. Relatives of the deceased 
person have a duty to renew his force through some ceremony that will induct that 
person into ancestral world. The ancestral world cannot be entered automatically 
upon death. It requires that the living keep the force of the recently deceased 
functional (ibid). Ezekwonna (2005:43) postulates that though a reality for 
African and Igbos in particular, death is an unwelcome phenomenon but their 
ancestral belief is what gives them hope that death is not the end but a transition 
into the world of ancestors. Parinder (1965: 58) also echoes the same view when 
he articulates that the ancestors are believed to have survived death and to be 
living in a spiritual world, but still taking active interest in the affairs of their 
families Parinder. This shows that in the traditional African society, death does 
not mean the end. There is the metaphysical world with ancestors and there is a 
connection between the living and the dead since the living are the ones who 
renew the force of a deceased person and make him join the long dead members 
of his clan or tribe. This again shows the communitarian nature of the traditional 
African society because one could not renew his own vital force. One needs other 
members of the community for his vital force to be re-activated. 
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Tempels goes on further in explaining what this concept of person means in real 
terms. He is of the view that a human being is more than a mere assemblage of 
powerful forces within and without which that may drive one’s life in a certain 
way as opposed to another. Tempels argues that the vital force that is found in 
man, as an individual, comes more to life fruition or realisation when that 
individual engages in relations with his surrounding environment. He relates to 
the supernatural world, to his fellow human beings and to inanimate things. Thus, 
Tempels argues “the living muntu is in relation of being with God, with his clan 
brethren, with his family and with his descendents. He is in a similar ontological 
relationship with his patrimony, his land, with all that it contains or produces with 
all that grows or lives on it” (Tempels 1959:67). Here, Tempels is clear and 
simple. Three issues can be derived from the above assertion: Firstly, without 
interacting with other forces (members of the society) an individual cannot be 
recognised as a complete person. Secondly the living person is mandated in the 
African traditional thought to relate to the supernatural world of ancestors. This 
implies the religious nature of African people. Thirdly, for a person to realise 
complete life, he has to relate apart from fellow beings, to inanimate things. This 
is very interesting because one can argue that Tempels meant that a person should 
seek harmony with nature.  
Tempels postulates that the Bantu ontology is very different from European 
ontology. He stated that the Bantu cannot be a lone being. It is not good enough to 
say that he is a social being, he feels and knows himself to be a vital force, at this 
very time to be in intimate and personal relationship with other forces acting 
above him and below him in the hierarchy of forces. He knows himself to be vital, 
even now influencing some forces and being influenced by others. The human 
being, apart from the ontological hierarchy and the interaction of forces has no 
existence in the conceptions of the Bantu (Tempels 1959:67). The point being 
stressed by Tempels is that without a relationship with other members of the 
community, the Bantu human person cannot be. On the same concept Dzobo 
(1992:131) argues that the whole of life in Africa is geared towards creativity. He 
says that ‘man’s’ ultimate task is to multiply and increase, but this power is not 
merely restricted to the ability to create children. It must extend to relations in 
community and good social standing. For him, the creative process is not limited 
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to bringing forth children, but it is seen as embracing the whole of man’s life and 
his relationships. He is to see his individual life and that of his society as fields 
that are sown with life’s experience and which should yield fruit. Matolino 
(2008:60) concurs with Dzobo when he argues that whatever one may take this 
force to be, what Tempels is driving at is that this force in question alone is not 
adequate to grant existence to the individual. The extra requirement that is needed 
is that the individual must be able to interact with other forces in the hierarchy of 
forces. Once that interaction is happening, and then ontologically, the individual 
is thought of as a real person that exists. Existence is affirmed by the ability to 
interact, the ability to turn vital force into meaningful relationship that are 
respectful of others and that create life in lower forces. 
 Tempels also discusses the importance of observing moral rules and the 
achievement of moral worth. He argues, it is always to accord with this 
conception of forces that the Baluba speak of “muntu mutupu” to indicate a man 
of middling importance devoid of real force, while the “muntu mukulumpe” 
indicates the powerful man who has his part to take in the community. The word 
“muntu” inherently includes an idea of excellence or plenitude. And thus the 
Baluba will speak of “ke muntu po”, which means “this is not a person”, of a man 
who behaves unworthily. They will use the phrase of a newly-born who has been 
begotten outside the normal ontological, moral and juridical conditions of clan life 
Tempels (1959:67). Maina (2008:196) argues that from Bujo’s perspective an 
individual person in an African society is required to fully interiorise the ethical 
demands of the community. These ethical demands include the integration of the 
ancestral norms by every member. 
Tempels articulates that another important criterion in defining the individual in 
the African context is the names given to newly born child. He says that the name 
not merely given to child for the sake of naming a baby like Joseph or Mary. 
Names in African culture are full of meaning. For Tempels “the name expresses 
the individual’s character of the being. The name is not a simple external courtesy 
it is, the very reality of the individual” Tempels (1959:70). Through names, 
African people could express their histories and achievement and it is normal that 
a parent names his son after his deceased father or any other deceased relative. 
Matolino (2008:63) argues that these names showed that man could never just 
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appear alone and exist on his own. The names that were given to individuals 
showed the connectedness of the tribe, clan and family or tried, at times to show 
the ties between the living and the dead. Hence every African name has a 
meaning. 
Dzobo shares the same opinion with Tempels when he argues that “the African 
view of man is derived from African view of reality which is found in the 
indigenous religion, creation myths, personal names, symbols and proverbs 
(Dzobo 1992:128). Paris argues that names in places do not only express the 
family history and the story of the child’s birth. He argues that they actually 
determine someone’s future and shape that person’s destiny and identity. Just by 
bringing one to understand the name, Paris says one will know so much about that 
individual. All African names are meaningful. They tell the story of the child’s 
birth and destiny. Much can be known about a person by understanding his or her 
name. While revealing the family understands of the person’s value, the name 
eventually shapes the person’s own self-understanding (Paris 1995:104). 
Tempels further argues that another criterion of the individual, of the concrete 
vital force is a man’s visible appearance. He asserts that, the level of force in an 
individual can be expressed in different ways. His vital force can be itself in a 
particular way in certain aspects or modes of external appearance of the man, 
which we may call moments or knots of high vital tension (Tempels 1959:54). For 
Tempels these expressions may come in the form of the speech or eye movement 
or any bodily expressions that the individual may use. This would show his state 
of force, whether it’s very high, diminished or somehow exhausted. Tempels also 
notes that this vital force can exert itself on other individuals in a negative way. 
That for example, a person who curses another, and the cursed gets sick may as 
well be held responsible for that illness (Matolino 2008:64). 
In summing up Tempels’ position concerning the understanding of a person in an 
African traditional thought, one can say that Tempels considers Bantu man as a 
vital force who can realise complete life through interaction with other living 
forces, the supernatural world and nature. 
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2.3. John Mbiti on African communitarianism 
John Mbiti is another African philosopher who contributed to the debate of the 
conceptualisation of a person in relation to the community in an African thought. 
Mbiti took further the discourse from Placide Tempels and as Tempels’ successor, 
Mbiti has been accused for being a follower of Tempels. Kaphagawani writes: As 
is well known Mbiti excelled as one of Tempels’ chief disciple. Like Tempels, 
Mbiti too was greatly driven by the zeal to reveal another way in which he 
believed African modes of thought to be characteristically distinct from Western 
counterparts Kaphagawani (2000:72). 
Mbiti starts by discussing the tribal nature among Africans and how this concept 
is connected to African communitarianism. According to Matolino (2008:65) 
Mbiti claims that each and every different tribal group or people in Africa have a 
common ancestor and share a common language as well as common rituals. 
Where a tribal group shares the same history it at least mythologically will trace 
its ancestry to the first man created by God or they will trace their ancestry to the 
first leaders of their tribe who established their group. This entails that Mbiti’s 
brand of communitarianism is one that mirrors African traditional religion. 
Religion is very central in African traditional cultures. 
Writing on tribes in Africa, Mbiti asserts that each tribe has got its own distinct 
religious system with which that tribe is identifies with. Members of a particular 
tribe are permanently fixed to their tribe because they are born in that tribe. Thus 
he argues; these are the main features of an African tribe, people, society or 
nation. A person has to be born a member of it and he cannot change tribal 
membership. On rare occasions he can be adopted ritually into another tribal 
group, but this is seldom done and applies to both African and non- Africans. 
Tribal identity is still a powerful force even in modern African statehood, 
although that feeling of tribal identity varies like temperature, from time to time 
depending on prevailing circumstances (Mbiti 1970:135). This aspect of tribes is 
very fundamental in the discourse of communitarianism because before we 
consider the whole community, we should recognise tribal groups through which 
different people belong and identify themselves with. 
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Mbiti also postulates that in the traditional African society, kinship system 
regulate the life of all members of the tribe. The entire tribe was tied to this 
kinship system. For Mbiti the kinship system is like a vast network stretching 
laterally (horizontally in every direction) to embrace everybody in any given local 
group. This means that each individual is a brother or sister, father or mother, 
grandmother, or cousin or brother-in-law, uncle or aunt or something else to 
everybody else (Mbiti 1970:136). This entails that each and every member of the 
tribal group is related and no individual is treated as a foreigner. Such societal 
setting contributes to the establishment of a communitarian society with a shared 
identity. 
Furthermore, Matolino (2008:68) argues that for Mbiti the kinship system is not 
merely restricted to the relations of people who are living but it also extends to 
include those who have passed on in life and those who are yet to be born. The 
living has a duty as seen above towards the dead, to keep their little soul alive and 
offer libations for it. Appiah also observes that, for as we shall see, many ritual 
acts of a religious nature have components that appear to be modelled on other 
social relations among people informs the notions of relations with other sorts of 
beings (Appiah 2004:26).  
Concerning the place of the individual in the traditional African society, Mbiti 
argues that a human person owes his existence to other people including those of 
past generations and his contemporaries. He is simply part of the whole. The 
community must therefore make, create or produce the individual, for the 
individual depends on the corporate group. Physical birth is not enough; the child 
must go through rites of incorporation so that it becomes fully integrated into the 
entire society. These rites continue throughout the physical life of the person, 
during which the individual passes from one stage of corporate existence to 
another. The final stage is reached when he dies and even then he is ritually 
incorporated into the wider family of both the dead and the living (Mbiti 
1970:141). From this assertion one can deduce two sacrosanct ideas which are: 
that the community has a special role in nurturing and upbringing of an individual 
for him to be socially acceptable and that in traditional African thought, death 
does not mark the end of life and relationship among the people of the same tribe 
or clan. There is strong bond between the dead, the living and the yet to be born. 
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Matolino (2008:68) postulates that Mbiti thinks the individual’s links to the 
community are of such an enduring nature that they cannot be separated from her 
own existence. The community also has a role in ensuring that the individual is 
indeed transformed into a real person. For Mbiti biological birth alone is not 
enough. There has to be some induction into all the stages that he calls ‘corporate 
existence’ and an individual cannot do that induction on her own, she requires the 
assistance of her fellow human beings in her community to attain that existence. It 
is a deeply religious transaction. Only in terms of other people does the individual 
become conscious of his own being, his own duties, his privileges and 
responsibilities towards himself and towards other people (Mbiti 1970:142). 
Again this simply entails that for one to fully realise his destiny purpose and 
worthiness in life he needs other people. 
Stressing on the symbiotic and mutual relationship between individual and the 
community, Mbiti argues that whatever happens to the individual happens to the 
whole group and whatever happens to the whole group happens to the individual. 
The individual can only say “I am because we are; and since we are, therefore I 
am”. This is a cardinal point in the understanding of the African view of man 
(ibid). This ideology depicts that in the traditional African society, individual 
achievements and challenges are taken to be of the community and the reverse is 
true. This collective approach as part and parcel of African communitarianism is 
very fundamental in identifying a people. Eze (2008:2) concurs with Mbiti when 
he argues that a community is formed by a ‘people’ a group of individuals that 
live together by fortune or misfortune of shared histories and heritage, of common 
fate and destiny. No community exist in a vacuum. At the same time however, an 
individual’s subjectivity is necessarily located and actualised within a community.  
2.4. Ifeanyi Menkiti on African communitarianism 
Ifeanyi Menkiti is another philosopher who contributed meaningfully to the 
debate of the person and community in the African traditional thought. Menkiti 
starts by outlining the difference that exists between the Western and the African 
concept of personhood. He claims that whereas most Western views abstract this 
or that feature of the lone individual and then proceed to make it the defining or 
essential characteristic which entities aspiring to the description of a human 
person must have, the African view of a person denies that person can be defined 
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by focusing on this or that physical or psychological characteristic of the lone 
individual. Rather a human person is defined by the environing community 
Menkiti (1984:171). Menkiti proposes that this is a matter that is best decided by 
the community since the reality of the communal world takes precedence over the 
reality of individual life histories, whatever these maybe (ibid). 
Outlining African difference like Mbiti, Sogolo (1993:90) argues that the African 
conception of a human person refers to asset of beliefs or picture of a person in 
the form of empirical generalisation. Sogolo is firmly against any formulation of 
personhood that has an appeal to universal understanding. To him such a view is 
devoid of experience but only heavily laden with theory. Thus, there may be some 
intellectual satisfaction in formulating a general theory or theories of human 
nature but it appears that the manifestations by a community of any theoretically 
implied human characteristics stands more significant. The point of significance 
here does not lie in some abstract understanding of what a person is capable of 
becoming but on the actualisation of his potentials and capabilities. In discussing 
the African conception of human person and society, the main objective is to 
provide a picture of human person and society held by African communities and 
to establish how human conduct, institution and thought patterns are governed by 
this conception (ibid). This shows that both Menkiti and Sogolo seek to establish 
African communal experience as the base for an understanding of the person. 
According to Matolino (2008:71) Menkiti contends that the individual comes to 
be aware of herself through the community. She comes to be whatever she is 
because of the community. Menkiti comments that the individual realises the 
community as a stubborn perjuring fact of the psychophysical world that the 
individual also comes to know himself as a durable, more or less permanent, fact 
of this world Menkiti (1984:172). 
Menkiti argues that the individual the individual can only become ‘a person’ 
because of the existence of the community and the community in his view, must 
take epistemic and ontological precedence over the individual. Menkiti makes it 
quite clear that in Africa it is the community that defines and gives the status of 
personhood to individuals. In his own words, he says “in the African view, it is 
the community which defines the person, and not some isolated static quality of 
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rationality, will or memory” (Menkiti 1984:172). This further strengthens the idea 
that without the community, an individual cannot be. 
Menkiti urges that a proper understanding of person or more precisely, the 
attainment of such a status is based on the belief that the concept of muntu in 
Africa “includes an idea of excellence of plenitude of force at maturation” (ibid). 
For Menkiti, those who do not have the above mentioned attributes could just as 
well be referred to as non –persons. He uses the phrase ‘ke muntu po’ which 
literally means ‘this is not a person’ to refer to those who show a lack of that 
plenitude of forces as suggested by Tempels. 
Menkiti argues that it is not enough to understand a person as a biological 
organism with certain psychological traits. Instead, he proposes that for 
personhood to be attained, an individual has to go through a long process of social 
and ritual transformation until it attains the full complement of excellences seen 
as truly definitive of man (ibid). The long process of social and ritual 
transformation entails that the community has a special role in nurturing an 
individual because without other members of the community one cannot go 
through social transformation. According to Wiredu (1996:15) the concept of a 
person is a social concept before it is anything else. Personhood is not an 
automatic quality of the human individual; it is something to be achieved. By this 
position Wiredu accords primacy and value to the community over the individual. 
On the same note, Taylor argues that human beings can only develop their 
characteristically human capacities in society. The claim is that living in a society 
is a necessary condition of the development of rationality in some sense of this 
property, or of becoming moral agents in the full sense of the term, or of 
becoming a fully responsible, autonomous being Taylor (1999:27). This entails 
that full development of a person cannot be realised outside the context of a 
community. 
Furthermore, Menkiti argues the community has got a role in prescribing certain 
norms to the individual. The individual may not question these societal 
prescriptions if he or she is to become a fully recognised person in their respective 
communities. Thus, as far as African societies are concerned, personhood is 
something at which individuals could fail, at which they could be incompetent or 
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ineffective, better or worse. Hence the African emphasised the rituals of 
incorporation and the overarching necessity of learning the social rules which the 
community lives so that what was initially biologically given can come to attain 
social self-hood that becoming a person with all the inbuilt excellences implied by 
the term Menkiti (1984:173). Maina (2008:194) also argues that the individual in 
an African communitarian ethic is at the centre of the determination of moral 
norms. It is not possible to answer the question of who comes first, the individual 
or a community in an African communitarian ethic, since one presupposes the 
other. Societal moral stipulations are very important and should be integrated and 
incorporated to be part of the individual development because without them one 
cannot fit and become a complete person in the African worldview. 
Menkiti argues that in Africa personhood is not automatically granted at birth but 
is acquired as one gets along in society. This getting along in society takes quite a 
lot of time, usually being attained by people who are of advanced age. These 
people, who are much older according to Menkiti, had the time to learn what it 
means to be a person through accumulation of knowledge of social values and 
norms that govern their particular society. By living up to, and adhering to these 
norms, they become successful in living up to the standard of personhood. Young 
people and children as postulated by Matolino (2008:74) are lesser persons 
because they have to learn all the moral requirements of their society and they still 
have to come to know how to behave as their elders do. So, for Menkiti 
personhood is something that is gradually acquired as one gets older and more 
accustomed to the ways of her respective community. If one defies or fails to fully 
comprehend the requirements of her community then she cannot become a person 
in the maximal sense of the term. 
Menkiti argues that for one to be considered a full person, that particular 
individual should exhibit unquestionable moral worth. Matolino points out that 
Menkiti claims that the English language supports this notion of personhood as a 
status that is gradually acquired by noting that it is acceptable grammatically in 
English to refer to a baby as an ‘it’ while the same reference cannot be used for an 
adult. The transition from an ‘it’ as a baby to a ‘him or her’ as an adult depends 
largely on the moral conduct of the individual. For Menkiti, the various societies 
found in traditional Africa routinely accept the fact that personhood is the sort of 
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thing which has to be attained, and is attained in direct proportion as one 
participates in communal life through the discharge of the various obligations 
defined by one’s stations. It childhood marked by an absence of moral function, 
into the person status of later years, marked by a widened maturity of ethical 
sense- an  ethical maturity without which personhood is conceived as eluding one 
Menkiti (1984:176). This simply entails that if an individual does not behave 
according to the moral expectations of the community he or she can fail to 
graduate from the ‘it’ status to full personhood. Adulthood is therefore conferred 
by the community. 
For Menkiti, the traditional African society has no place and space for an immoral 
and evil person. A virtuous or generous person is considered a full person with 
great importance in the society. Evil and self-centred or immoral people 
contribute nothing to society hence Menkiti thinks they are not persons. Sharing 
the same view with Menkiti, Paris argues that the symbiotic functions of various 
societal practices contributed immensely to the on-going task of moral formation, 
which was not complete until the end of the person’s life. Hopefully, by the time 
the person became elder he or she would have attained wisdom, viewed as the 
accumulated communal knowledge underlying all of life’s experiences. This 
connoted the capacity to guide and judge others. In fact, old age implied not only 
the attainment of such wisdom but also the temporal proximity of elders to 
ancestor hood. These factors were the basis for the African reverence of elders 
whose words of blessing or curse were extremely powerful Paris (1995:109). 
Stressing on the concept of morality in Africa Mbiti also argues that the essence 
of African morality is that it is more “societal” than “spiritual”, it is morality of 
conduct rather than a morality of being. This is what one might call “dynamic 
ethics” rather than “static ethics” for it defines what a person does rather than 
what he is. Kindness is not a virtue unless someone is kind; murder is not evil 
until someone kills another in his community Mbiti (1996:70). 
2.5. Kwame Gyekye on African communitarianism 
Before discussing the nature of his version of moderate communitarianism, 
Gyekye began by attacking Menkiti and Mbiti for exaggerating the value and 
importance of community in the understanding of personhood in Africa. Gyekye 
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disapproves Mbiti and Menkiti’s version of communitarianism as radical and 
philosophically inexcusable. 
Another accusation that was levelled against Menkiti by Gyekye is the assertion 
that full person is attained when one is older and has been a member of the society 
for a long time. Gyekye claims that the terms ‘more of a person’ and full person 
are incoherent and bizarre Gyekye (1997:39). Gyekye notes that Menkiti does not 
tell us what those excellences are which enable the old to be more of persons than 
the young. In persuading the issue further, Gyekye argues that if it is correct that 
personhood depends on age and the attainment of moral rectitude, it then raises a 
problem that Menkiti could just as well fail to resolve. Thus the difficulty is in 
considering elderly people as necessarily moral, or as necessarily having the 
ability or disposition to practice moral virtues satisfactorily. For, surely there are 
many elderly people who are known to be wicked, ungenerous, and 
unsympathetic: whose lives in short do not reflect any moral maturity or 
excellence. In terms of moral conception of personhood, such elderly people may 
not qualify as persons Gyekye (1997:49). 
Gyekye found Mbiti and Menkiti’s version of communitarianism problematic 
especially in the sense that it does not recognise individual freedom. According to 
Matolino (2008:77) Gyekye claims that although an individual is a social being, 
he is also other things. The other things that he has in mind concern attributes 
such as virtue, the ability to make individual choices and rationality. He argues 
that if these attributes play any meaningful role in individual’s life like setting 
goals and making important decisions then it cannot be said that an individual is 
completely defined by the social structures that she finds herself in. He concede 
that although many of our goals are set by the community we live in, it is still 
possible for individuals to make their own choices and decide on what goals to 
purse and what to give up. To this Gyekye argues that “in the light of the 
autonomous or near autonomous character of its activities, the communitarian self 
cannot be held ads shackled self, responding robotically to the ways and demands 
of the communal structure. That structure is never to be conceived as reducing a 
person to intellectual or rational inactivity, servility and docility. Even though the 
communitarian self is not detached from its communal features and the individual 
is fully embedded or implicated in the life of her community, the self 
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nevertheless, by virtue of or by exploiting what I have referred as its “mental 
feature” can from time to time take distanced view of its communal values and 
practice and reassess or revise them” Gyekye (1997:55-6). Gyekye’s point seems 
to be very significant because in real life, individual freedom is necessary for one 
to make choices for the development of the self and the community at large. 
Bell concurs with Gyekye when he argues that to uphold the value of the priority 
of community does not necessarily deny an individual of her own identity, her 
potential creativity role in a community, nor does it absolve her of personal 
responsibility for her actions toward the whole community. It is also clear that as 
multicultural factors increase, new values are placed on older ones- the African 
concept of community must be re-valued in light of present realities Bell 
(2002:64). By this notion Bell suggest that although the community still has a 
respectable space in the understanding of the individual in Africa, it has to 
accommodate the real pressures of multicultural factors brought by globalisation 
and acculturation in the modern dispensation in Africa. Bujo (1998:97) affirms 
that freedom and the ethical responsibility of the individual within the black 
community cannot be expressed more forcefully. Once more, the reciprocal 
relationship between the community and the individual has to be emphasised. 
When we say that on the grounds of participation theory, an individual is not in 
position to live outside the community, then the same community must be eager 
to promote and support the interest of the individual. The clan community 
therefore must do everything to enable each one to have fullness of life. On the 
same aspect, Obiechina postulates that of necessity, the hold which the 
community has over the individual cannot be so constrictive that the expression of 
his individuality is completely frustrated; the individual cannot be so 
individualistic in his outlook that he regards his interest as entirely independent of 
those communities within which he lives. Either case would have led to the 
complete impoverishment of both. In the traditional society a happy means exist 
which imparts strength and unity. Its essential humanism, as exemplified in the 
folktale narratives, arises from the awareness of the individual destiny with a 
large, more inclusive communal destiny (Obiechina 1965:94). 
Although Gyekye rendered Mbiti and Menkiti’s version of communitarianism 
problematic, he however concedes with approval that Menkiti’s account based on 
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moral conception is appealing to the communitarian view of person. He turns his 
attention to the understanding of person that exists among the Akan. Matolino 
(2008:77) asserts that Gyekye notes that the Akan understanding of person, which 
is communalistic, would classify someone who chooses to lead isolated lifestyles 
as non-person. An individual who exhibits morally reprehensible conduct is also 
branded as a non-person. He says for the communitarians personhood is earned in 
the moral arena and not just handed over to the individual at birth. Matolino 
(2008:77) argues that for Gyekye, the moral conception of personhood is given 
concrete expression by the Akan people, especially when it comes to the burying 
of the dead. The grief shown in mourning the departed individual depends on her 
moral conduct. If a person conducted herself in a manner that was morally worth, 
then she is properly mourned regardless of her class or wealth. This simply shows 
that in the traditional African thought one’s moral standing is highly treasured and 
determines one’ s relationship with the whole community. 
Turning to his moderate communitarianism, Gyekye argues that 
communitarianism sees the individual as an inherent communal being, embedded 
in a context of social relationships. For him, a community refers to a particular 
social setting and networks characterised by sharing an overall way of life. 
Sharing an overall way of life entails the existence and acknowledgement of 
common roles, values, obligations and meanings or understandings Gyekye 
(1997:43). Senghor (1964:28) also claims that Negro-African society is 
collectivist or more exactly, communal, because is rather a communion of souls 
than an aggregation of individuals. This simply entails that the individual is 
perceived, understood and conceived as part and parcel of the community. 
For Gyekye communitarianism views the community as a reality in itself and not 
as a mere association of individuals. A community in the context of 
communitarianism is seen as a group of persons linked by interpersonal bonds, 
which are not necessarily biological, who consider themselves primarily as 
members of a group and who share common goals, values and interest (ibid). 
Gyekye holds that the interpersonal bonds that exist among individuals need not 
to be biological for a community to be formed. This distinction separates Gyekye 
from Menkiti and Mbiti. 
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Gyekye argues for a concept of person that is different from Mbiti and Menkiti. 
From his knowledge of the Akan language and cultural traditions Gyekye 
(1997:40) argues that there are certain proverbs that exist in his language which 
clearly show that it is accurate to recognise and conceive the individual as an 
entity that exist on his own who is responsible for whatever happens to him in his 
own life. Below are some of the proverbs quoted by Gyekye from his Akan 
language which he claims, show the individuality of each member of the African 
community: 
1. The clan is like a cluster of trees, when seen from afar, appear huddled 
together but which would be seen to stand individually when closely 
approached. 
2. Life is as you make it yourself.  
3. It is by individual effort that we can struggle for our heads. 
4. Life is war Gyekye (1997:40) 
These proverbs indicates that individual effort is recognised in African scheme of 
things and to consider the community as the sole mentor of the individual is 
grossly misrepresent the understanding of a person. 
Okolo also shares the same opinion with Gyekye when he argues that the status of 
the self as an individual entity then is recognised in African philosophy, proof that 
self has somewhere a double status- one as a being- in -relation-to -others, the 
other as unique and non-duplicatable. One of the clearest ways the African 
establishes this fact of uniqueness, identity and discreteness is through name. 
African names are not just mere labels of distinction, to differentiate, for instance 
James from John Okolo (2003:215). What Okolo asserts at this point is that names 
in Africa echoes special meanings about a particular individual. A name in Africa 
for instance can express the fortunes or misfortunes of the family or can explain 
the circumstances that surround the birth of that particular person.  
Writing about the Igbo people of Nigeria, Ezekwonna argues that we can 
confidently talk of personal names and behaviour as ways of recognising personal 
identity in African- Igbo ontology. It is important to mention that Igbo names 
have meaning and each name is reasonably personal. A name like Chukwuna 
(God knows) remains identical to a person and does not cease to exist in the 
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community. According to Ezekwonna (2005:75) a name is the first mark of 
personal identity in African communities and it is impossible to talk of somebody 
without a name which has meaning among Africans. Bujo further elucidates this 
point by saying that there is a difference between names given to a child in the 
traditional African setting and in the western sense where names are transmitted 
from father to the son. Every child has his own name which is given according to 
the circumstances at birth. The name given to him characterises him and makes 
him unique and as historical person in the community (Bujo 2001:147). 
In his version of moderate communitarianism, Gyekye elaborates what he calls 
the idea of common good. By common good Gyekye meant those universal 
desirable things needed for the normal function of an individual within a society. 
Cited in Mwinobi (2003:66) Gyekye argues that the common good means a good 
that can be said to be commonly, universally, shared by all human individuals, a 
good the possession of which is essential for the ordinary or basic functioning of 
the individual in a human society Gyekye (1997:45). Of interest from this 
assertion is the idea that the common good is essential for basic functioning of the 
individual in a society. This sounds communitarian because it concedes that the 
individual exist in a society. 
For Gyekye it should be understood that by “the goods of all members” one is 
referring only to what can be regarded as the basic or essential goods to which 
every individual should have access. There is no human being who does not 
desire peace, freedom, respect, dignity, security and satisfaction (ibid). By 
arguing that every human being requires peace, freedom and other basic aspects, 
Gyekye is simply pushing further his position that the understanding of a person 
includes other aspects apart from the stipulations and dictates of the community. 
This is so because if one has peace, freedom and satisfaction for instance he can 
she can claim to be a complete individual before the approval of a community. A 
peaceful, free, secured and satisfied individual can become a better individual in 
the bigger human community. 
Central to Gyekye’s communitarianism is the idea of community of mutuality. 
Gyekye (1997:42) maintains that a community whether it is a communo-cultural 
community or a political (multicultural) community, is understood as a group of 
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persons interconnected by interpersonal bonds who among other share common 
goals, values and interest. Such a community Gyekye calls a community of 
mutuality. Individual members of the kind of community are seen as inherently 
communal beings and never as isolated individuals.  
Gyekye further holds that the sharing of an overall way of life is an important 
characteristic of a cultural community that distinguishes it from a mere 
association of individual who are held together and sustained merely contractually 
(Gyekye 1997:42). This entails that if individuals share a common way of life 
they will be identified as one community with mutual way of life. 
In the community of mutuality, members are expected to show concern for the 
well-being of one another with the aim of advancing the common good and 
interest. As Gyekye puts it, members have intellectual and ideological as well as 
emotional attachments to their values and as they cherish them, they are ready to 
pursue and defend them (ibid). 
Gyekye (1997:144) maintains that since there are various constitutive elements of 
culture apart from language, it should be possible for people to share any aspect 
of a culture without a shared language. Also, the issue of common good, 
irrespective of shared language cannot be separated from the notion of the 
community because as a member of the community, the individual would need to 
have food, shelter, security, good will friendly and self-respect. 
As part of his moderate communitarianism, Gyekye discusses what he calls the 
principle of reciprocity. He claims that the  communitarian moral and political 
theory, which considers the community as a fundamental human good, advocates 
a life lived in harmony and co-operation with other, a life of mutual consideration 
and aid and of interdependence, a life in which one shares in the fate of the 
individual’s nature or potential. For Gyekye, this kind of life, that is life of mutual 
consideration and aid and of interdependence is very rewarding and fulfilling 
Gyekye (1997:76). Koenane (2014:181) echoes the same opinion when he argues 
that the idea of poverty was therefore taken care of because wealth was measured 
in terms of having the cattle and the ability of people to ensure that their 
neighbours had some kind of feeding. Koenane (2014:183) further argues that the 
Africa communitarian outlook was primarily a welfare approach and being kind 
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to others and allowing them to share in one’s fortune was never a big deal in rural 
African communities. From this assertion one can see that in a communitarian 
society members could mutually rely and depend on each other for their better 
lives and the better of the whole society. For Gyekye the concept of mutuality that 
is based on interpersonal bonds could be expressed as follows, “members of the 
community are expected to show concern for the well-being of one another, to do 
what they can to advance the common good and generally to participate in the 
community life” (Gyekye 1997:76). By this notion Gyekye cements the view that 
in a communitarian society individuals are expected to live together, assist each 
other in times of need. By so doing the community will be identified as one.  
  
Another aspect that is central to Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism and that 
distinguishes him from Menkiti is the idea of rights. For Gyekye individuals 
should be allowed to exercise their rights in the private domain. Gyekye 
maintains: individual rights to expression that are of strictly private nature may 
not be disallowed, unless is overwhelming evidence that such expressions can, or 
do, affect innocent members of the society Gyekye (1997:65). If Gyekye is clear 
that individual should exercise their rights in private domain then it means he is 
acknowledging that the stability and well-being of the society takes precedence 
and should not be disturbed by individual rights. 
The aspect of responsibility as a principle of morality underpins Gyekye s 
communitarianism. In his attempt to show the meaning of responsibility as it 
applies in his idea of communitarian ethics write: “by responsibility, I mean a 
caring attitude or conduct that one feels one ought to adopt with respect to the 
well-being of another person or other persons Gyekye (1997:66). This caring 
attitude Gyekye talks about refers to character and personal disposition that 
enables one to consider the welfare of other individuals of the community as very 
important hence strives to improve it. 
Gyekye points out that an ethic of responsibility stresses sensitivity to the interests 
and well-being of other members of the community, though not necessarily to the 
detriment of individual rights (ibid). Here, Gyekye is reminding people that the 
aspect of individual rights should not be compromised in the whole equation 
where the individual is deemed to be responsible in the community. 
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Gyekye maintains that the communitarian ethic acknowledges the importance of 
individual rights but that it does not do so to the detriment of responsibilities 
which the individual member have ought to have towards the community or other 
members of the community. According to Mwinobi (2003:79) Gyekye holds that 
community life constitutes the basis for moral responsibility and obligations. This 
entails that individuals are bound to behave and interact in a way that is morally 
acceptable. Each member of the community demonstrates a high level of moral 
responsiveness and sensitivity to the needs and well-being of other members. 
There is a close connection between the ethic of responsibility and other ethical 
values underpinning the communitarian ethics. 
For Gyekye the ethical values of compassion, solidarity, reciprocity, cooperation, 
interdependence and social well-being, which must be counted among the 
principles of the individual with respect to the community and its members. All 
these considerations elevate the notion of responsibilities on the individual with 
respect to the community and its members. All these considerations elevate the 
notion of responsibilities to a status equal to that of rights in the communitarian 
and moral thought Gyekye (1997:66). 
2.6. Masolo on African communitarianism 
Masolo (2010:231) argues that Negro-African society puts more stress on the 
group than on the individual, more on the solidarity than on the activity and needs 
of the individual, more on the communion of persons than on their autonomy. 
This entails that the welfare and flourishing of the society takes precedence over 
individuals in the African setting. 
For Masolo (2010:241) knowledge of communitarian values is passed on to 
individuals at crucial points in their growth and development from childhood to 
adulthood. This is done both systematically through well-defined procedures and 
randomly in the course of everyday life where people learn from the examples of 
others, from various modes of speech (such as orders, commendation and praise, 
criticism and rebuke, and proverbs and stories), and from a person’s participative 
learning when he or she is asked to perform certain duties or is shown how to do 
normal things of life in some very specific ways. 
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Significant in Masolo’s version of African communitarianism is the aspect of 
initiation ceremonies among traditional African societies. Masolo (2010:242) 
postulates that it is during the period of seclusion during initiation ceremonies that 
young people are taught the values that sustain the social order. They are taught 
the knowledge that regulates their performance of adult roles, which inscribe the 
specific traditions and customs that define their community and distinguish it 
from others. Masolo further postulates that, initiation is a communal ritual in 
which age sets take an oath of collective responsibility to safeguard the deepest 
knowledge of society and its ways. In this sense, being a person is attained 
through an educational process that intensifies at every stage in a person’s growth 
and development (ibid). 
Masolo (2010:243) argues that the period of seclusion in the forest gives society 
the space and time to cultivate and groom the person in etiquette that embodies 
the fundamentally altruistic impulse underlining social being. It is this altruistic 
character that will enable an individual to share whatever one has with other 
members of a community. In connection to this, Koenane (2014:183) asserts that 
we believe that the African communitarian outlook was primarily a welfare 
approach and being kind to others and allowing them to share in one’s fortune 
was never a big deal in rural communities. 
Masolo (2010:245) argues that communitarianism represents the view that the 
attainment of human needs and interest is best served in union with others. 
Wiredu (1996:22) also postulates that in its moral definition communitarianism 
exemplifies belief in the principle of practical altruism as an important social 
virtue. It recognises and encourages sharing with others as an important 
characteristic of human life.                  
Of much interest in Masolo’s version of African communitarianism is how he 
managed to marry the African communitarian ethic together with the modern 
African life. Masolo (2010:248) argues that Africans have appropriated the 
meaning and effects of the modern economy in their own way. One of these ways 
is how Africans relate their access to modern economic benefits or goods 
associated with the new economy and there is little doubt that they experience the 
pain of sacrificing for others. But in doing this, they are driven by a sense of 
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culturally specific “obligation”, the communitarian ethic. This simply implies that 
the communitarian philosophy has survived through time and history and is 
continuing to direct, influence and shape human behaviour and development in 
the modern African socio-economic dispensation. 
Modern Africa is experiencing a number of ills such as war or political instability, 
famine and floods (Masolo 2010:257). It is through the altruistic and benevolent 
nature of Africans that they are managing to assist each other from these plights. 
To this Masolo (2010:252) writes, one cannot imagine what it would be like 
without the charity and benevolence of all those others, African and non-Africans 
alike, who have taken refugees, pure strangers in most cases, into their homes and 
provided for them for no other reason than their concern for those who are 
experiencing hardship. One could cite an endless list of cases where this ethic has 
been a sustaining and reassuring value to millions of Africans in situations of near 
despair. 
2.7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I discussed how the concept of person in relation to the 
community in the African thought is understood by Placide Tempels, John Mbiti, 
Ifeanyi Menkiti, Kwame Gyekye and Masolo. Though these philosophers differ in 
the way they present their views pertaining to what exactly underpin and 
undergird African communitarianism, they do share a common ground that the 
individual in the African concept cannot be understood outside the community. 
The individual cannot exist without other members of the society. Placide 
Tempels through his vital force thesis holds that the Bantu human person is a 
living force which needs to interact with other persons for it to realise complete 
life. For Tempels, communitarian morality is of significance if a person needs to 
be accepted in the African society. Mbiti discusses tribal nature of traditional 
African society arguing that tribes have distinct religious beliefs to which they 
identify themselves with. For Mbiti the individual does not and cannot exist alone 
except with others members of the clan or society. Mbiti and Menkiti hold that 
physical birth is not enough to identify a person. An individual has to be 
incorporated through rites and rituals to be identified as a person. 
44 
 
Gyekye stands for a different version of African communitarianism. Though he 
concedes that the individual is understood as part of the bigger community, he 
accuses Mbiti and Menkiti for coming up with what he termed radical 
communitarianism which according to him does not recognise the issue of 
individual autonomy and rights. For Gyekye, individual autonomy and rights 
should not be compromised at the expense of the community. Gyekye’s moderate 
communitarianism constitutes rights and freedom, the community of mutuality, 
the common good, and the principle of reciprocity as well as responsibility as a 
principle of morality. Masolo’s version of African communitarianism also 
acknowledges that the community and the individual cannot be conceived 
separately and the welfare, moral demands and expectations of the community 
takes precedence over those of the individual. Masolo discusses the significance 
of initiation ceremonies in imparting important social and cultural knowledge in 
traditional African setting. What makes Masolo’ version of African 
communitarian ethic different from those of other philosophers is that it 
encompasses the modern African society. In this regard, Masolo managed to 
depict that contemporary Africans are sharing personal economic gains with other 
members of the community. Such works of charity and benevolence are made 
possible because modern Africans are conscious of the communitarian 
philosophy. All these aspects as discussed in this chapter provide a clearer 
understanding of a person in relation to the community in the African socio-
ethical thought.  
The next Chapter looks at a critique of Western environmental ethical theories 
which have shaped the environmental discourse since its inception in the 1970s. A 
critical evaluation of these ethical theories will provide a background upon which 
an advocacy for their substitution with other approaches particularly of African 
orientation will be established. 
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    CHAPTER 3 
3. A CRITIQUE OF WESTERN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICAL 
THEORIES 
3.1. Introduction 
This Chapter seeks to provide a critical appreciation of Western environmental 
theories namely; land ethic, deep ecology, ecofeminism and social ecology. A 
critical understanding of these traditional environmental theories is crucial in 
providing a foundational background regarding environmental ethics debate.  
Leopold’s land ethic states that an interaction with nature is right when it tends to 
preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community and is wrong 
when it tends otherwise (Leopold 1949:225). This means that humans are allowed 
to interact with nature if their interaction does not harm the nature. However, this 
assertion sounds anthropocentric in the sense that if ever there is a room for 
human beings to interact with nature chances are that they will use nature to their 
advantage. 
Land ethic entails that human beings exist as part of the integrated community of 
animals, plants, soils, rocks and water. Humans have a moral obligation to 
preserve the integrity of the biotic community by seeking co-existence with 
nature. 
Critics of Land ethic has argued that Leopold’s use of the word ‘stability’ is 
controversial in the sense that it presented nature as static or stagnant. Knight and 
Riedel (2002:31) argues that word stability in particular has been problematic. 
The term seems to endorse a view of healthy nature as static or unchanging that 
contemporary ecologists reject. The researcher found Knight and Riedel’s 
argument significant because nature itself passes through a number of stages and 
processes such as reproduction and adaptability to various climatic conditions 
hence cannot be regarded as stable. Furthermore, there are some natural hazards 
such as floods which pose threat to other plant and animal species. In such 
circumstances it is questionable to regard nature as stable. 
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Sessions (1995:68) argues that Naess’s deep ecology entails that nature should be 
allowed to flourish for it has value in itself. From a deep ecologist point of view, 
well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on earth have value in 
themselves. For deep ecologist, humans have no right to reduce the richness and 
diversity of nature except to satisfy vital needs. Deep ecology further discusses 
that human population should decrease in order to ease pressure on the natural 
environment. Realising the excessive human interference on nature, deep ecology 
movement calls for practical course of action to be taken to conserve nature. 
 Ecofeminist argues that there is a connection between the domination of women 
by man and the domination of nature by human beings. Ecofeminist suggest that 
the domination of nature can only end by ending the domination of women by 
man. Murphy (1988:86) postulates that many ecofeminist explore the symbolic 
association and evaluation of women and nature that appears in art, literature, 
religion and theology. Drawing on feminist literature some argue that patriarchal 
conceptions of nature and women have justified a two-pronged rape and 
domination of the earth and the woman who live on it. 
Social ecologist such as Bookchin argues that environmental problems emanates 
from hierarchical social structures. In other words, social ecologist asserts that 
there is a connection between modern and capitalistic societal hierarchies and 
environmental problems. Bookchin (1986:38) asserts that environmental problems 
are directly related to social problems. In particular Bookchin claims that the 
hierarchies of power prevalent within modern societies have fostered a 
hierarchical relationship between humans and natural world. 
 3.2. Land ethic 
Aldo Leopold’s land ethic is one of the prominent American environmental 
theories. For Leopold, an interaction with nature is right when it tends to preserve 
the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community and is wrong when it 
tends otherwise (Leopold 1949:224-225). From this assertion one can argue that 
Leopold adopts a prescriptive approach in which he judges the rightness and 
wrongness of an interactive action with nature basing on the ability to preserve or 
disturb the natural ecosystem. In other words, Leopold is simply implying that 
human beings should avoid all kind of interaction with nature that damages the 
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same. Leopold’s land ethic is premised on an understanding that humans exist 
within an integrated community of life that also includes other animals, plants, 
rocks, soils and waters. For Leopold, these collectively constitute what he referred 
as biotic community or the land (Leopold 1949:224-225). Leopold (ibid) asserts 
that humans are plain members and citizens of the biotic community and therefore 
have a moral obligation to act consistently with the long term welfare of that 
community. That welfare is linked to the ways a community functions especially 
to its capacity under human use to remain fertile and productive over the long 
term. 
Callicott (1987:41) understands Leopold’s ethic as a claim that the land 
community has intrinsic value and that humans are duty-bound to respect it by 
fostering its ecological functioning. By intrinsic value, Callicott entails that land 
community has inherent worth and should not be treated as means to ends but as 
end in itself. 
Norton (2003:61) viewed Leopold’s ethic chiefly as an outgrowth of pragmatic 
efforts to promote land conservation. For Norton, Leopold’s aim was to craft an 
ethic that would prompt people to live in ways that foster long term human 
welfare. As a result, Leopold’s ethic remains within the standard anthropocentric 
ethical paradigm and is best analogized not to Kantian or other deontological 
perspectives but to the pragmatic moral reasoning of William James (ibid). This 
simply entails that Leopold’s ethic accommodated human interest hence the 
accusation that it is anthropocentric. 
Although Leopold’s land ethic has been applauded as one of the popular western 
conservationist environmental discourse, it has been challenged for a number of 
reasons. Knight and Riedel (2002:31) argue that word stability in particular has 
been problematic. The term seems to endorse a view of healthy nature as static or 
unchanging that contemporary ecologists reject. The word integrity also poses 
difficulties in the sense that the term typically refers to the totality of species and 
perhaps also to the full range of biological assemblies that existed in particular 
landscape before humans arrived. 
Jardins (1997:1) asserts that Leopold’s normative conclusion (the land ethic) 
seems to be derived in some way from the facts of ecology. Even assuming that a 
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factual and meaningful basis exists for attributing integrity, stability, and beauty 
to ecosystems (which is in the air) how these facts are connected to the value 
conclusion remains an open question. 
 
The validity of Leopold’s ethic has also been questioned by Callicott. Callicott 
(1999:45) asserts that Leopold’s ethic is questionable because of changes in 
ecological thought since his day. Callicott view Leopold’s ethic as a throwback to 
an earlier, discredited era of ecological understanding. The researcher feels that 
Callicott’s argument sounds logical in the sense that for any theory to be 
significant, it should move with time. This means that it should be applicable in 
different ages of time so, if land ethic cannot find its space and place in the 
contemporary environmental debates then its authenticity and validity is very 
questionable. 
3.3. Deep ecology  
According to Sessions (1995:2) deep ecology is a radical environmental 
philosophy that was articulated and presented in April of 1984 by Arne Naess and 
George Sessions to essentially gather up environmental thought with eight basic 
principles. The first basic principle in deep ecology movement is that, the well-
being and flourishing of human and non-human life on earth have value in 
themselves. These values are independent of the usefulness of non-human world 
for human purposes. This principle entails that both human and non-human 
species have inherent or intrinsic value in themselves. Ambrosius (2005:2) asserts 
that the most important part in the first principle is that every human and non-
human has its own inherent value and thus has its own right to live and flourish. 
Essentially, everything has an “own” to it, and therefore has its own irreducible 
right to live, to blossom, to reach its own fullness in existing and reproducing. In 
its own right, each living thing is independent and separate of its “usefulness” to 
any other thing specifically of humans. 
The second principle of deep ecology movement is that, “richness and diversity of 
life contribute to the realisation of those values and are also values in themselves” 
(Sessions 1995:68). This principle addresses the reason why everything should be 
considered as having its own value through the explanation of interconnectedness. 
This idea strengthens the significance of biodiversity in the universe, that 
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everything is connected to everything else. There is dependence and reliance of 
everything upon everything and nothing can be more or less than anything else in 
the web of life. Devall and Sessions (1985:15) argue that deep ecology really calls 
for humans to view everything as in the relationship Naess describes between 
object A and B. “An intrinsic relation between two things A and B is such that the 
relation belongs to definitions or basic constitutions of A and B, so that without 
the relationship A and B are no longer the same thing”. So what it means is in 
their endless relationship and interdependence all things help to contribute to the 
richness and diversity in life and the web is moreover not about the complication 
with the inclusion of all things, but the beautiful complexity that is brought about 
by all things. This principle stipulates that there is need to value the richness and 
diversity of life forms in and of themselves because we rely on them. 
         The third principle of the deep ecology movement is that, humans have no right to 
reduce the richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs (Sessions, 1995:68). 
This principle is prescriptive in the sense that it categorically puts it that humans 
have no right to disturb nature save for vital needs. This is one of the most 
controversial principles of deep ecology movement because firstly it sounds 
anthropocentric in the sense that it admits that human beings have the right to 
reduce richness and diversity of nature to satisfy their vital needs. For the 
researcher, this implies that human beings are therefore free to destroy nature as 
long as they satisfy their vital needs. The second problem with this principle is 
that the term ‘vital’ is relative. It varies from people to people, from place to place 
and from time to time depending on other socio-economic and religious factors. 
In other words there is no a universally applicable conception of what is vital. 
Cutting trees to get firewood is vital to other people whilst it’s a different case 
altogether in the other society. Ambrosius (2005:3) argues that the second 
principle of deep ecology is somewhat of a vague area and it was meant to be left 
this way for individuals’ interpretation of what they define as vital needs. While 
some would say that vital needs are just food, clothing and shelter, many others 
may say that all of the daily activities and ways of life are vital needs.  
         The fourth principle of the deep ecology platform says that, the flourishing of 
human life and culture is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human 
population. The flourishing of non-human life requires such a decrease (Sessions 
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1995:68). This means that the increase in human population puts pressure on the 
environment hence the need to cut population growth. Devall and Sessions 
(1985:5) argue that for Naess, increasing population is simply not the best for 
quality of life, nor is it good for the environment and therefore needs to be 
significantly cut back. By doing so, this will bring about stabilization of the 
ecosystem. If this is not done, Naess says that substantial decrease in richness and 
diversity are liable to occur. On this one Naess and Sessions seem to have a valid 
point theoretically but practically it is difficult to cut human population taking 
into consideration that world over population is growing daily. 
         The fifth principle of the deep ecology platform says that, present human 
interference with the non-human world is excessive and the situation is rapidly 
worsening (Sessions 1995:68). This principle simply identifies the source of 
environmental problems which is none other than human interference. Human 
interference with nature has become very excessive to such an extent that it is 
severely destroying the natural ecosystem. Boudouris (2005:28) shares the same 
view when she argues that certain human activities have definite bad effects on 
the environment and result in a serious ecological imbalance which can surely 
bring very dangerous consequences for the subsistence of human beings 
themselves and risk the lives of other beings on the globe. To this principle Naess 
further explains that human interference has continually done more harm than 
good because ecosystems are developed to maintain themselves. 
         The sixth principle of the deep ecology asserts that, policies affect basic 
economic, technological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply 
different from the present (Sessions 1995:68). This principle simply entails that 
there is need for a paradigm shift in terms of policies regarding human 
interference with nature. This change in policy and human worldview on nature 
will result in a better environmental state of affairs. Maathai concurs with the 
sixth principle of deep ecology when she argued that today we are faced with a 
challenge that calls for a shift in our thinking so that humanity stops threatening 
its support system. We are called to assist the earth to heal her wounds. 
         The seventh principle of the deep ecology says that, the ideological change is 
mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in situations of inherent worth) 
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rather than adhering to an increasing higher standard of living. There will be a 
profound awareness of the difference between big and great (Sessions 1995:68). 
This principle asserts that to reduce environmental degradation caused by man’s 
overdependence on nature, people should strive for quality life. Ambrosius 
(2005:3) clearly points out that the seventh principle of deep ecology platform 
supports a simplified life style. It addresses the fact that quality of life should take 
precedence over quality of things to reach a higher level of happiness instead of 
higher standard of living. It calls for voluntary simplicity, meaning that not only is 
it that the human reduction of needs must happen, and it is essentially thought to 
have a purpose of completely transforming every single part of human life. 
         The eighth principle of deep ecology platform says that, those who subscribe to 
the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to participate in the 
attempt to implement the necessary changes (Sessions 1995:68). This principle 
calls for real action to liberate natural environment from human domination. It is 
the pragmatic principle of deep ecology because it calls upon those who subscribe 
to deep ecology movement to practically see to it that nature is not negatively 
interfered by human life. Boudouris (2005:31) shares the same view when she 
argues that, I think that it is the right time for us to extend the meaning of the 
common good to include the natural world. Natural world in this sense is to be 
shared by every possible human being and an essential human element for human 
subsistence. 
         Shedding more light on meaning of the eighth principle, Ambrosius (2005:5) 
asserts that the aforementioned seven principle, after read and understood, call for 
an obligation of direct and indirect action. It is not necessarily about obligation, 
however, but what understanding of these principles should bring about in its 
awareness and intension of a better living and in theory a better environment. 
Deep ecology does not call for just the earth to be fought for itself but for these 
values to be fought and for a new change in the world to develop and take over. 
By addressing just the environment, there are many things that are overlooked and 
essentially what this philosophy is trying to get across is a coming about of a 
better world as a whole, spawned by the better individual. It is something that can 
and should be adopted by all humans, and through living these principles, it is 
theorised that not just the environmental problems will disappear, but social, 
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political, economical and human relational problems will dissolve as well (ibid). 
This simply entails that all social, political and economic spheres are linked to the 
environment and a good relationship with natural environment guarantee a good 
life altogether. 
         The deep ecology movement has been criticised from various angles. Among the 
critics, Watson cited in Brennan (1999:115) finds deep ecology problematic 
especially in its desire for man to be treated equally with nature, when all other 
nature is allowed to live out its evolutionary potential in interaction with one 
another while man is supposed to not to do so. Furthermore, Watson’s biggest 
problem with deep ecology is its anti-anthropocentric approach. Watson believes 
that humans will only care about the environment if they see its usefulness for 
humans thus there is a very good reason for thinking ecologically, and for 
encouraging human being to act in such a way to preserve a rich and balanced 
planetary ecology (ibid). For Watson, moving beyond anthropocentrism has the 
risk of losing the majority of the population in the environmental movement and 
this is where Naess and Sessions failed (Ambrosius, 2005:4). 
         To counter the above allegation by Watson, Naess gives an example by telling a 
story of a pack of wolves which came to a small village. The small village went 
out to their unattended herd of sheep one day and realised that a pack of wolves 
had eaten every single sheep. The people of the village became very angry and 
worried because they feared that if the wolves had eaten their sheep, what would 
stop them from eating their own children on their way to school. The people of 
the village decided that the best thing to do is to kill the pack of wolves. Now as 
an environmental protector of these wolves, an anthropocentric argument would 
not serve them. No one would understand why it would be beneficial to serve the 
wolves because they would not understand the premise of the wolves being a 
necessity to human survival. However, people would be much more likely to 
defend the wolves from being killed if they saw that the wolves had their own 
intrinsic value just as humans do and just as the sheep did, to live and flourish. In 
this case, the killing of the wolves would be decided against and the community 
members would work something out where the wolves and their children would 
all be protected (Ambrosius 2005:4). 
53 
 
         Bookchin (1988:13), a social ecologist criticised deep ecology for reducing 
humans from complex social beings to simple species, a scourge that is 
overpopulating the planet and devouring its resources. Although human beings 
are responsible for degrading the environment, describing them as a scourge 
overpopulating the planet is not proper. The researcher feels that such description 
is a fallacy of composition because not all human beings are ignorant about 
conservation of natural environment. 
         According to Norton (1991:41) scholars have found the disclaimer that deep 
ecology is not a normative system and ought not to be judged as such 
disingenuous. They have treated deep ecology as the legitimate object of the 
analysis of moral philosophy. Some regard deep ecology as strident axiological 
egalitarianism that is useless in adjudicating conflicting interests. If all organisms 
are of equal value, then there is no basis upon which to make prescriptions 
because the kind of value distinctions necessary for evaluating the moral 
situations of environmental ethics are deliberately disqualified. This principle of 
bio-centric egalitarianism, on this view, renders deep ecology impotent as an 
ethical theory. 
         Deep ecology has also been criticised by feminist. The Australian philosopher Val 
Plumwood for instance argued that the notion of the expanded self- results in 
boundary problems stemming from the impulse of subordination (Plumwood 
1993:178). Furthermore, Richard Sylvan (1985:10) argues that some ecofeminist 
holds that affirming the ontological interconnectedness of all human and no-
human organisms and the non-living environment does not necessitate an embrace 
of the holism of self-realisation. The premise that individuals are not absolutely 
discrete does not entail the conclusion that all relations are internal and 
individuals are ontologically chimeras. Certainly removing human apartheid and 
cutting back human supremacy are crucial in getting the value of theory (ibid).  
Critics of deep ecology argue that it is just too vague to address real 
environmental concerns. For one thing, in its refusal to reject so many worldviews 
and philosophical perspectives, many have claimed that it is difficult to uncover 
just what deep ecology advocates. For example, on the one hand, Naess offers us 
eight principles that deep ecologists should accept, and on the other he claims that 
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deep ecology is not about drawing up codes of conduct, but adopting a global 
comprehensive attitude. Now, if establishing principles is important, as so many 
ethicists believe, perhaps deep ecology requires more precision than can be found 
in Naess and Sessions’s platform. In particular, just how are we to deal with 
clashes of interests? According to the third principle, for example, humans have 
no right to reduce the richness and diversity of the natural world unless to meet 
vital needs. But does that mean we are under an obligation to protect the richness 
and diversity of the natural world? If so, perhaps we could cull non-native species 
such as rabbits when they damage ecosystems. But then, the first principle states 
that non-human beings such as rabbits have inherent value, and the fifth principle 
states that human interference in nature is already excessive. So just what should 
we do? Clearly, the principles as stated by Naess and Sessions are too vague to 
offer any real guide for action. 
3.4. Ecofeminism 
According to Warren (1990:125) ecofeminism is the position that there are 
important connections-historical, experiential, symbolic and theoretical between 
the domination of women and the domination of nature, an understanding of 
which is crucial for both feminism and environmental ethics. For Cheney 
(1987:145), ecofeminism is a sensibility, intimation that feminist concerns run 
parallel to, are bound up with concern for a natural world which has been 
subjected to much the same abuse and ambivalence behaviour as have women. 
Most fundamentally, ecofeminism is the belief that we cannot end the exploitation 
of nature without ending human oppression and vice versa (Gaard, 2011:19). 
From these articulations, one can deduce that generally ecofeminism is the 
position that ecology and feminism are related and that these movements need 
liberation from male or human domination. 
Before providing the main ideas that underpin ecofeminism, the researcher feels 
that it is plausible to begin by providing a short socio-history of the ecofeminist 
movement. Mayer (1994:6) argues that Susan Griffin traces in chronological 
order, the different attitudes that have been advanced throughout the history of 
western societies about women, about nature, about women’s nature and about the 
natural women. Griffin begins with the beginning of Christianity and shows how 
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it serves as a fundamental for the association and the resulting negative view of 
both nature and women. For Griffin (1998:7) the ultimate Christian goal is to rise 
above this earthly world and to go to heaven and be with God, who is of eternal 
form and not matter. The human body is mere matter, and God gave it a soul. He 
did this for men and only men. Women were created from man’s matter and have 
none of the Godly element in them. Therefore they are tied to the material world 
and are inferior to men who are connected to the eternal world. The researcher 
feels that such a conception is dehumanising because it reduces women to objects 
only to be used to further the interest of man. 
Mayer (1994:6) asserts that Griffin goes on to show that the vast majority of our 
culture’s scientific findings and intellectual endeavours have been designed or 
manipulated to support such a dichotomy, one that divides man/woman, 
active/passive, and most importantly for ecofeminism, human/nature. Several 
feminist other than Griffin have studied the manner intellectual and scientific 
thought has supported the dichotomy. The association between woman and nature 
is crucially attributed to the period of enlightenment. Mayer argues that during the 
enlightenment period, the framework of modern science was constructed. In the 
enlightenment period, salvation is seen in the power of man to use his distinctly 
human rationality to overcome the wilderness of nature and harness the elements 
by his will (Mayer 1994:6). So it became not only the scientific job but the moral 
responsibility of man to exert power over nature. While this attitude toward nature 
was becoming firmly entrenched in the cultural mind, nature and woman were 
becoming closely linked. As a result of such beliefs advanced throughout history, 
the association of nature and women has become embedded in the conceptual 
framework of our culture (ibid). 
According to Warren (1991: xi) many ecofeminist philosophers have argued that, 
ultimately, historical and causal links between the domination of women and of 
nature are located in conceptual structures of domination and in the way women 
and nature have been conceptualised, particularly in the western intellectual 
tradition. Murphy (1988:86) postulates that many ecofeminist explore the 
symbolic association and evaluation of women and nature that appears in art, 
literature, religion and theology. Drawing on feminist literature some argue that 
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patriarchal conceptions of nature and women have justified a two-pronged rape 
and domination of the earth and the woman who live on it. 
Starhawk (1989:10) postulates that many ecofeminist and ecological feminist 
philosophers have documented empirical evidence linking feminism and the 
environment. Some point to various health and risk factors caused by the presence 
of low level radiation, pesticides, toxic and other pollutants and borne 
disproportionately by women and children. Others provide data to show that First 
World developments policies foster practices regarding food, forests, and water 
which directly contribute to the inability of women to provide adequately for 
themselves and their families. 
Warren (1990:45) argues that much of the ecological feminist philosophical 
literature on feminism and the environment has linked the two ethically. The 
claim is that the interconnections among the conceptualisation and treatment of 
women, animals and the rest of non-human nature require a feminist ethical 
analysis and response. Minimally, the goal of feminist environmental ethics is to 
develop theories and practices concerning humans and the natural environment 
which are not male- biased and which provide a guide to action in the pre-feminist 
presence. 
        Warren (1987:4-5) suggest that although the concept of ecofeminism has come out 
to mean quite different things to different ecofeminist it is at least based on the 
following claims: (i) there are important connections between the oppression of 
women and the oppression of nature, (ii) understanding the nature of these 
connections is necessary to any adequate understanding of the oppression of 
women and the oppression of nature, (iii) feminist theory and practice must 
include an ecological perspective and (vi) solutions to ecological problems must 
include a feminist perspective. 
Mayer (1994:7) further argues that ecofeminist goal is the adoption of a new 
attitude toward nature, one that realises the interconnectedness of humans and 
nature instead of treating nature as a resource for filling human needs. The reason 
for adopting a new attitude is the desire to end the oppression of women as well as 
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nature, not just prolong the environment’s life span so that humans can continue 
to use it. 
Ruether (1975:204) wrote that women must see that there can be no liberation for 
them and no solution to the ecological crisis within a society whose fundamental 
model of relationship continues to be one of domination. They must unite the 
demands of the women’s movement with those of the ecological movement to 
envision a radical reshaping of the basic socio-economic relations and the 
underlying values of this modern industrial society. 
Archambault (1989:17) asserts that some ecofeminist have argued that women are 
in a better position than men to relate with nature, that they are in fact closer to 
nature. These are the proponents of the body-based argument which claim that 
women, through their unique bodily experiences like ovulation, menstruation, 
pregnancy, child birth and breast feeding are closer to and can more readily 
connect with nature. Fortman (1985:245) argues that women are typically more 
dependent than men on tree and forestry products and they are primary suffers of 
forest resources depletion. Trees provide five essential elements in these 
household economics: food, fuel, fodder products of the home (including building 
materials, household utensils, gardens, dyes, medicines) and income-generating 
activities, As trees become scarce, it is women who must walk farther for 
firewood and fodder and who must carry it back themselves. Although this point 
seeks to support the view that women are related to nature, it carries some 
overtones of anthropocentrism. 
Just like any other school of thought, ecofeminism has also received quite a 
considerable number of criticisms from fellow feminist themselves as well as 
other philosophers across the intellectual village. 
Attacking the position that women are closer to nature simply because of their 
unique body experiences  such as menstruation and ovulation just to mention a 
few, Roach (1991:52) argues that although men do not menstruate, bear children, 
or breastfeed, they do share all other human biological processes such as eating, 
sleeping,  eliminating wastes, getting sick and dying. In addition in their 
ejaculation of semen they have experiences of a tangible stuff of the reproduction 
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of life. Furthermore, if child bearing or breastfeeding is what attunes women to 
nature, are women who do not experience these biological processes any less 
connected to nature. 
Eckersley (1992:67) argues that because women have historically been less 
implicated than men in the process of environmental degradation, they occupy a 
vantage point of ‘criticism otherness’ from which they can offer a different way 
of looking at the problems of patriarchy and ecological destruction as do other 
groups such as indigenous people and other ethnic minorities. However, 
Eckersley cautions ecofeminist to be wary of over- identifying with, and hence 
accepting uncritically the perspective of woman. 
Mayer (1994:20) argues that the first objection at ecofeminism’s assertion that 
ecology and feminism must co-operate in order to achieve their goals, that neither 
a movement to end the oppression of women nor one to end the abuse of nature 
can be complete or successful without taking the other into consideration. This 
assertion is simply false because it is entirely possible to imagine that the goals of 
ecology could be met while those of feminism are left unmet and vice versa. For 
instance, it is perfectly conceivable that our society could come to the realisation 
that, unless we reform our treatment of the natural world we live in and with, we 
are dooming ourselves to certain destruction. This can happen without integrating 
feminist views. 
Archambault (1989:15) postulates that the most common criticism of 
ecofeminism is that the claim that women are essentially or biologically closer to 
nature is regressive, that it reinforces the patriarchal ideology of domination and 
limits ecofeminism’s own effectiveness. As a result it merely perpetuates the 
notion that biology determines the social inequalities between men and women. 
This notion is also echoed by Dobson (1990:202) who argues that ecofeminism 
proposes a dangerous strategy, to use ideas that have already been turned against 
women in the belief that, if they are taken up and lived by everyone, then a 
general improvement in both the human and no-human condition will result. If 
they are not taken up, then woman will have sacrificed themselves to 
environment, and this is a price some feminist are clearly not prepared to pay. 
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As another critique of ecofeminism Biehl (1991:26) reiterates that if we believe 
that woman are connected with nature and possess the character traits necessary 
for preserving the environment, then it follows that they are most qualified to 
serve the earth. Men cannot be expected to participate in this restoration project 
since they presumably lack the sensibility to nature that women have. Women 
will therefore simply end up in charge of cleaning up the global mess- fulfilling 
their traditional role as nurturing mothers. In the end, the implications of 
ecofeminist ethics hardly appear to be emancipator for women. 
Feldman (1998:91) argued that the problem with eco-feminism is that the claim 
that the domination of nature is wrong in the same way that the domination of 
women is wrong makes no sense, since domination can only be considered to be 
unjust when the object dominated has a will.  
The researcher feels that eco-feminism is just a project of disgruntled women who 
have realised that the feminist movement will remain a utopia given the 
patriarchal nature in most societies. As a result they think that their views can get 
attention if presented alongside environmental issues. The researcher therefore 
suggests that feminist movement should continue to fight for the liberation of 
women and leave environmental issues to be grappled with independently. 
3.5. Social ecology 
Social ecology is a theory that was propounded by Bookchin. Bookchin (1986:38) 
asserts that environmental problems are directly related to social problems. In 
particular Bookchin claims that the hierarchies of power prevalent within modern 
societies have fostered a hierarchical relationship between humans and natural 
world (ibid). 
Bookchin (2001:64) argues that humans must recognise that they are part of 
nature, not distinct or separate from it. Human societies and human relations with 
nature can be informed by the non-hierarchical relations found within the natural 
world. For example, Bookchin points out that within an ecosystem, there is no 
species more important than another, instead relationships are mutualistic and 
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interrelated. This interdependence and lack of hierarchy in nature, it is claimed, 
provides a blueprint for a non-hierarchical human society. 
Best (1998:337) asserts that social ecology claims that all current environmental 
problems are ultimately social problems, rooted in an irrational and anti-
ecological society whose crisis cannot be solved through piecemeal, single-issue 
reform measures. 
Bookchin (1990:32) further argues that dislocations in the human nature relations 
stem from dislocations within the human world itself and environmental problems 
emerge from long history of hierarchical social relations that culminate in a class-
ridden, profit-driven, accumulation-oriented capitalist society. Best (1998:338) 
postulates that for Bookchin global warming, the destruction of the rain forest, the 
dumping of toxic wastes, and the overconsumption of resources exist not so much 
because human beings have developed anthropocentric attitudes, abuse their 
technological genius, cannot adequately govern themselves, or are breeding out of 
control, but rather because they have a long history of dominating each other and 
of colonizing the social and natural worlds as mere resources for power and profit. 
Bookchin (1990:32) postulate that social ecology seeks to reveal the historical 
factors that have rendered many human beings into parasites on the world of life 
rather than active partners in organic evolution. This entails that as an ecological 
movement, social ecology seeks to do away with all historical and social 
ideologies that promotes human’s exploitative dependence on nature and call for a 
mutual relationship between human beings and nature. 
Bookchin (1986:6) points out that the historical emergence of hierarchy in human 
society over tuned a social equilibrium of equality, which led to the domination of 
some groups of human beings over others and the idea or notion of the 
domination of nature. Social domination in its long, millennial history has given 
rise to all the religious, moral and philosophical justifications for the domination 
of nature, the destruction of wildlife, and the destruction of wildlife and the 
destruction of human life. Every ecological problem we face today apart from 
those caused by nature itself has its roots in social problems. 
61 
 
Bookchin (1990:121) reiterates that the reduction of the female to a mere object 
of male power and desire had enormous consequences for subsequent history, as 
the domination of man over women led to the domination of natural world. The 
subjugation of her nature and its absorption into the nexus of patriarchal morality 
forms the archetypical act of domination that ultimately give rise to man’s 
imagery of a subjugated nature. This simply entails that there is a similarity 
between ecofeminism and social ecology. Both theories consider the domination 
of women by man as the source of ecological problems on earth. Ecofeminist and 
social ecologist therefore believe that for any project of ecological liberation to be 
successful, it has to first liberate women from male oppression and also 
understand the power hierarchies that exist in societies.  
Social ecology has also been criticised for its limitations. To begin with, Best 
(1998:351) argues that Bookchin did not offer analysis of crucial ecological issues 
such as the disappearance of wilderness and wildlife. He clearly decries the loss 
of ecological diversity, but he does not aggressively champion the preservation of 
land and species as fundamental social policy.  
Best further suggest that Bookchin also does not take a strong stand against 
overpopulation problem, another focus of deep ecology as opposed to social 
ecology. Bookchin steadfastly ignores the problem except to point to areas where 
population numbers are going down and to target, rightly so western lifestyles as 
more critical an issue than increase of people in underdeveloped countries. 
One major problem that has been identified in social ecology is that the 
assumption that societal hierarchies are the source of domination of nature is 
irreconcilable because in the natural ecosystem there are weak individuals and 
weak species which are often killed, eaten and out- competed in an ecosystem. 
This simply entails that hierarchies do exist even in natural ecosystem and if it is 
the case then should we blame societal hierarchies for the domination and 
exploitation of nature. 
Social ecology has also been criticised for being anthropocentric because in his 
account, Bookchin (2001:125) talks of the liberation of both humans and nature. 
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According to Eckersley (1992:152) this liberation process will not just occur on 
its own accord, rather, human beings must facilitate it. 
Another problem with social ecology is that are there examples of non-
hierarchical societies that have no ecological problems at all? Failure by 
Bookchin to provide such evidence based on anthropological and historical 
research findings renders social ecology weak environmental theory. This simply 
entails that Bookchin misrepresented the causal link between societal structures 
and environmental exploitation. 
3.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the researcher has discussed the facets of traditional Western 
environmental ethical theories. Of interest is that the researcher observed that in 
as much as these theories differ in terms of their articulations concerning the 
relationship between humans and the environment, they share common ground. 
For instance, all these theories agree that human interaction with nature is the root 
cause of all environmental problems. These theories also concur that nature 
should be preserved for its own good and to achieve this, human being are duty-
bound to conserve and preserve nature. This shows that these theories constitute 
the major aspects that underpinned environmental debate in the Western societies. 
However, these theories have been criticised for their shortfalls. Most of them 
have been found anthropocentric. This means that they fail to attach inherent or 
intrinsic value to non-human things. Ecofeminism in particular has been criticised 
for alleging that without liberating women from male domination efforts to 
liberate nature from human oppression will remain a utopia. This is because it is 
argued that there is a clear cut line between feminist movement and ecological 
concerns. For instance a society can come to a realisation that it has to treat nature 
properly for the continuity of its life without paying attention to feminist 
ideologies. 
Social ecology has also been found problematic because the allusion that 
environmental problems emanate from societal hierarchies poses more questions 
than answers. For instances, does it mean that all societies without hierarchies are 
free from environmental problems? What about environmental problems caused 
63 
 
by natural hazards such as floods? Are floods societal? Taking into consideration 
the discussed drawbacks, one can note that although Western environmental 
theories are applauded for their contribution to the historicity, authenticity and 
rhetoric of environmental discourse, there is need for more new approaches to 
interpret emerging environmental problems across the globe. 
The task of the next chapter is to critically expose the significant relationship 
between the African concept of communitarianism and environmental ethics. In 
other words the chapter seeks to provide information that will close the 
knowledge gaps which Western environmental ethical theories failed to close.                                 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4. THE CONTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN COMMUNITARIANISM TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS. 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter seeks to critically lay bare the relationship between the concept of 
African communitarianism and environmental ethics. The underlining 
fundamental assumption is that African communitarian societies put priority to 
the welfare of the community other than the individual. Gyekye (2003:42) in his 
version of moderate communitarianism argues that communitarianism sees the 
individual as inherently communal being, embedded in a context of social 
relationship interdependence. What this entails is that a communitarian society 
shares and upholds similar religious beliefs, an understanding of morality, 
proverbs and more importantly guided by Ubuntu. These, among other aspects 
define a communitarian society. Basing on this premise as a rallying point, it 
suffice to indicate categorically from the onset that the main thrust of this chapter 
is to see how African religious beliefs, morality, proverbs and Ubuntu can supply 
us with necessary environmental knowledge upon which an African 
environmental ethic can be formulated. The main objective is that by end of this 
chapter one should stand, with intellectual strength and vigour, to vehemently 
consolidate the claim that it is indeed pragmatic and practical to have an 
environmental ethic with indigenous African flavour. 
The researcher has observed that African traditional religion through creation 
myths, sacred animals, sacred places, sacred forests or trees, taboos, totems and 
proverbs and witchcraft is a rich source of environmental pedagogy. According to 
Sheridan and Nyamweru (2008:6) the supremacy of sacred groves and community 
beliefs are mutually dependent. Since sacred forests are considered places of 
memory it is a taboo to harvest natural goods from such groves. According to 
Kaoma (2010:88) many African cultures believes that God, ancestors and other 
spirits can manifests in nature. For instance, the Mere people of Kenya believe 
that ancestors reside in sacred forest, caves, water pools and valleys. These places 
play a crucial role in different cultic observances. The Chewa of Malawi and 
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Zambia believe that ancestors reside in certain trees, graveyards, cooking stones 
and rivers. 
On the relationship between Ubuntu and environmentalism, Ekwealo (2014:199) 
argues that while some critics may argue to contrary on Ubuntu’s ecological 
spirit, the ethical implications of Ubuntu can still be seen to have ecocentric 
implications. This is because the values it promotes when taken to their fullest 
cannot really be in defence of human beings alone. It shares in the universal 
essence contained in the African metaphysical and epistemological meaning of 
force or spirit which links up humans, animals, plants, and the so called 
inanimate. 
The African conception of morality as an element of communitarianism, also 
embraces an environmental disposition. A community with shared moral 
worldview has similar environmental outlook. Ugwuanyi (2005:6) argues that it 
should be supposed that since the environment is meant to serve as a moral 
support then it should be treated as such. It is clearly wrong to except a good from 
an environment that has been badly treated. Such terms of reciprocity are what the 
African moral world demands. 
4.2. Traditional African religion and environmental ethics 
Traditional African religion is one of the major elements of African 
communitarianism. Through it, one can have an appreciation of African 
environmental outlook. Opoku in Kelbessa (2010:470) points out that there is a 
community with nature since man is part of nature and is expected to cooperate 
with it; and this sense of community with nature is often expressed in terms of 
identity and kinship, friendliness and respect. Writing on African traditional 
religion, Ugwuanyi (2005:7) points out that African traditional religion is a 
cultural and religious manifestation specific to Africans. It is regarded as 
indigenous religion because it originates from the people’s environment. Taringa 
(2006:200) postulates that human life is also one with the animals, plants and the 
rest of the world. The highest good is to live in harmony with all sacred forces. 
Mazrui et al in Murove (2004:201) postulates that traditional African culture and 
religion had started from the premises that the whole universe, no merely man had 
been created in the image of God and so many African societies made some trees 
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sacred, some hills holly, some animals totemic siblings, some forests the abode of 
ancestors. African cultures made no sharp distinction between the human race and 
other species. 
Traditional religion in Africa is a communal religion which individuals becomes a 
part of by belonging to a particular community. Everyone in the community is 
anticipated to partake in rituals and festivals. It is impossible for individuals to 
disassociate themselves from the community rituals, festivals, worship or 
sacrifices (Mazrui et al in Murove 2004:202). This clearly depicts the 
communitarian nature of African traditional religion because each member of the 
community is expected to conform to all religious beliefs and practices as dictated 
by the community. 
Ugwuanyi (2005:7) asserts that African traditional religion can be described as a 
complete way of life. It is taught orally to the younger generations who in turn do 
the same to the next generation (ibid). The religion is preserved everywhere 
through myths, legends, songs, dance, painting, carving, adages, symbol, 
sculpture and language. Even the trees and rivers around remind the community 
of something about this religion and form of worship. From this submission, one 
can argue that African religion as an element of culture is a comprehensive 
religion in the sense that it encompasses the philosophy of life of a people and the 
environment. 
According to Sheridan and Nyamweru (2008:6) the supremacy of sacred groves 
and community beliefs are mutually dependent. Since sacred forests are 
considered places of memory it is a taboo to harvest natural goods from such 
groves. Doing so is also considered an attack on ancestors and other spirits. From 
this perspective, people are likely to conserve nature out of reverence for spiritual 
forces resident in nature as opposed to instrumental reasons alone. For this reason, 
most sacred areas are lightly used as compared to the less sacred ones. Parinder in 
Kaoma (2010:135) notes that Shona sacred groves are refuge spaces for every 
creature. The Zimbabwe ruins, he argues are uncanny and sacred places. It is said 
that if one tries to break a twig from a tree, it cries out ‘do not break me’. No 
living creature may be killed there, and if an animal is pursued into the ruins it 
calls out ‘do not kill me’. 
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According to Kaoma (2010:88) many African cultures believes that God, 
ancestors and other spirits can manifests in nature. For instance, the Mere people 
of Kenya believe that ancestors reside in sacred forest, caves, water pools and 
valleys. These places play a crucial role in different cultic observances. The 
Chewa of Malawi and Zambia believe that ancestors reside in certain trees, 
graveyards, cooking stones and rivers (ibid). Further, particular animals such as 
zebras, lion and certain snakes are considered ancestral avenues through which 
ancestors visit their former communities and are often recognised by their 
descendants. Gelfand in Chimuka (2001:29) argues that according to Shona 
philosophy, God has no shape. He is not in the form of a human being. The Shona 
say that the creator is as they know, a whiff of wind or air who inhabits the 
heavens above but who may be found in places as the depth of earth, in the 
mountain or forest 
Kaoma (2010:126) argues that among the Tonga of Gwembe for example, 
domestic animals are named after their dead relatives. Apart from the spiritual 
significance of such naming, the act shows that Africans relate to the natural 
world. Mbiti, cited in Kaoma (ibid) argues that God is the originator and sustainer 
of man, the spirits explain the destiny of man, man is the centre of this ontology, 
animals, plants and natural phenomena and other objects constitute the 
environment in which humanity lives provides a means of existence and if need 
be humanity established a mystical relationship with them. What is crucial from 
Mbiti’s submission is that God, human beings and the natural environment 
constitute African ontology. It is through the conception of God that the African 
people become conscious of their natural environment through which they 
practice their religion. Again, worth noting from Mbiti’s argument is the fact that 
by alluding that man is at the centre of the ontology, he does not imply that man 
should harm the natural environment. Rather, man should seek coexistence with 
nature. 
 Writing on the need for an inter-religious dialogue on ecological issues, Evers ( 
1997:251) argues that since all religions contain reference to creation or other 
explanations of the origin of the earth combined with ethical demands to use the 
resources of the earth in a responsible way, to protect the different species of 
animals and plant life and to be aware of the fact that each generation is 
68 
 
responsible for the next, there is a growing expectation that the different religions 
actively join the group of concerned people to work towards the creation of an 
ecological ethics. Evers’ point sounds very logical in its contribution to the 
environmental debate because it seeks to find ecological solutions within various 
religions.  
 
Mbiti (2001:368) postulates that another basic element of African religion 
concerns human relations with the world of nature. Humans are not masters over 
nature to exploit it without feeling or treat it without respect. Instead people are 
one with nature, responsible toward nature, able to communicate with nature, and 
the chief priests of nature. This position is also echoed by Ekwealo (2014:197) 
who argues that Africans do not believe that a human being is a special image of 
God who was charged with the lordship of nature. Rather, Africans believe in the 
unity of forces, and a human being’s special position is rather more that of a 
caretaker of the universe, a task which goes with appropriate responsibility and 
consequences. 
 
 Another aspect that makes part and parcel of African religion particularly Shona 
is witchcraft. Taringa (2014: 46) points that the Shona also hold a strong belief in 
witchcraft. Very often they explain disease and misfortune in terms of witchcraft. 
They believe that witches use animals, birds and snakes as familiars. Boudillon in 
Taringa (ibid) confirms this observation. He writes, “Witches are supposed to 
keep familiar beasts of the night or of stealth, such as hyenas, owls, ant bears and 
snakes, which they can ride and send on their errands: these beasts can be used to 
bewitch a victim”. Most Shona people are afraid of killing these animals because 
of fear of witchcraft. Others kill them in the belief that witches may not frequent 
places where there are no familiars to use (Taringa: 2014: 46) 
4.2.1. African creation myths and environmental ethics 
Traditional African religion cannot be understood without considering creation 
myths. Most creation myths depict the relation between the origin of a particular 
ethnic or tribal group of people and the environment.  Bucher in Taringa 
(2014:43) argues that the Shona myth of creation traces the origin of life and 
existence of nature to a great pool (dzivaguru). The myth begins with Mwari 
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making the first human called Mwedzi (moon). This is at the bottom of the pool 
(dziva). Mwari gave Mwedzi a medicine horn (gona). Mwedzi asked to go out to 
the dry land. Mwari gave him a wife called Masasi to accompany him. The two 
lived in a cave. They gave birth to grass, bushes and trees. After this Masasi went 
back to the pool and Mwari gave Mwedzi another wife called Morongo. Morongo 
gave birth to all kinds of animals. Eventually she bore boys and girls. Because the 
children had grown up, Morongo refused to continue sleeping with Mwedzi. She 
asked him to sleep with his daughters. As a result he became chief (mambo) of a 
great people. Masasi chose to sleep with a snake that she hid under her bed. One 
day Mwedzi forced Masasi to sleep with him and the snake bit him. Mwedzi fell ill 
and there was drought. The children consulted a diviner about the persistent 
drought. They were told to send the sick chief back to the pool. After this they 
chose another man to be their king. 
 
 According to a Sudanese Bassa myth of creation, God created the world and all 
creatures including humanity (Kaoma 2010:132). At that time there were no 
animosities between humanity and animals; humans and non-humans lived in 
peace. Unlike other myths that blame animals for death, the Bassa attribute death 
to human disobedience. It is believed that the ever-working and watching 
Supreme Being Lolomb had warned humanity to resist sleeping but humanity 
chose to fall asleep and thus the reason death came into this world. This led to 
hostility between humans and the rest of creation (ibid). 
 
Wringley P in Kaoma (2010:133) postulates that the Chewa people of Malawi 
have a myth of Kaphiri- Ntiwa. According to this myth, human beings, animals 
and God lived together in harmony until one person invented fire and set the grass 
ablaze. The animals fled in terror and God too escaped into sky, leaving humans 
alone with their disastrous power and knowledge. This myth points to an ancient 
African time where humans and non-humans lived together harmoniously. What 
is imperative is that if the contemporary Chewa people of Malawi could live with 
the myth, their encounter with nature would be improved for the better because to 
them, animals and plants will be their friends. 
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Another creation myth is of the Lozi of Zambia. Parrinder in Kaoma (2010:134) 
points out that according to the myth, Nyambe created earth and all its creatures. 
Unfortunately one creature called Kanomu (human being) imitated God, forged 
iron spears and killed an antelope. Nyambe was very annoyed with Kanomu for 
killing his own brother. Nyambe forgave Kanomu but Kanomu did not repent. 
Armed with his spears, he killed a buffalo and other animals. Nyambe was very 
upset and sent misfortune on earth and then retired to the sky. To date the Lozi 
believe that it is evil to kill certain animals and birds. Umaru (2006:28) alludes 
that the Yorubas of Nigeria believe that rivers, hills, forests in some locations 
have their own spirits hence people offer sacrifices to spirits that indwells the 
trees and the rivers. 
The researcher has deduced two important issues from the above discussion on 
creation myths. Firstly, Africans believe that there is a Supreme Being responsible 
for all creation, be it human, animal, and plants. This shows that Africans are a 
religious people. It is through the conception, belief and respect of God that 
Africans consider some animals, trees, places and water sources sacred. By 
considering nature as sacred and religious, Africans end up conserving 
environment. Kelbessa (2005:22) postulate that for the Oromo of Ethiopia, Waaga 
(God) is the guardian of all things and nobody is free to destroy natural things to 
satisfy his or her needs. Mbiti in Kelbessa (2005:23) also reiterates that humans 
are not the masters of the universe. Instead they are friends, the beneficiaries and 
the users although they are at the centre of the universe. Secondly, the researcher 
has noted that as portrayed in the myths, God, human beings and animals lived 
together peacefully in harmony. Such a relationship was very significant in so as 
it could promote interdependence. To this, Tangwa (2006:389) argues that this 
metaphysical worldview involves the recognition of and acceptance of inter-
dependence and peaceful coexistence between earth, plants, animals and humans. 
This metaphysical outlook underpinned the ways, manner and cosmically 
relations between human and his fellow humans. It is also responsible for why 
traditional Africans were more cautious in their attitude to plants, animal and 
inanimate things and the various invisible forces of the world. 
Traditional African societies practiced their religion through various natural 
phenomena such as land, trees or forests, animals, water bodies and mountains. 
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Taboos and the concept of totemism cannot be excluded from the discourse of 
African religion and environmental ethics. This is so because taboos and totemism 
seeks to protect the environment from a religious point of view.  
4.2.2. African Traditional Religion and Land 
Writing about how environmental is African religion, Taringa (2006:204) 
postulates that the Shona share with most Africans the belief in land. Land is 
believed to be sacred because it bears the remains of the ancestors particularly in 
the form of graves of the chief. Shona religion is based on the grave (ibid). In 
central rituals of kumutsa midzimu (ritual in honour of ancestors) the point of 
entry is the grave. In other rituals libations are poured on the ground. In the land is 
also buried the umbilical cord of people. Land is the abode of the dead. What this 
simply entails is that there is a strong religious and cultural connection between 
Africans and their land and as a result traditional African society consciously or 
unconsciously preserve natural land. Taringa’s point also shows that there is a 
difference between African and Western conception of the land. With Africans 
taking land as sacred and religious, Western societies regard land as important for 
mining, farming and other capitalistic and economic activities. This does not 
mean that the traditional Africans do not use land for agrarian and mining 
activities, rather, the Africans balance religion and economics in their usage of 
land.  
4.2.3. African traditional religion and Animals 
Traditional African religion respects certain animals because it is believed that the 
living dead communicate with the living through such animals. Taringa 
(2006:206) argues that most African societies recognise that spirits operate in the 
human world animals, birds and fish. For instance each Shona subgroup has its 
own taboos and restrictions towards particular animals. Nyajeka (1996:137-138) 
postulate that the mutupo( totemism) principle focuses on fostering the primary 
relationship between animals and humans, animals and the deity, humans and 
humans, nature and humans, the dead and the living. The mutupo principle 
attempts to enumerate or appropriate the ideal life which assures a sustainable 
future of all existence. An analysis of the fundamental elements of the mutupo 
principle reveals that it is a principle which seeks to create a cosmology that takes 
the existence of non-human entities seriously. 
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Taringa (2006:206) further argues that most Shona names are the names of the 
totemic animal. Members of the clan are forbidden to eat the flesh of the animal. 
In some cases there is a taboo on some part of the animal. A person may not be 
allowed to eat for example, the heart or trunk of an elephant or possibly inedible 
part. If one breaks the taboo one may lose hi her teeth or experience some other 
harm. Cited in Taringa (2006: 7) Pongweni argues that the totemic animal has a 
taboo attached to it or to part of its carcass such that the totem bearer is forbidden 
to eat. Infringement of this taboo has certain concomitant magical sanctions such 
as loss of teeth or leprosy. What this entails is that since Africans are a religious 
people, infringement of such a taboo is not an option. This has a positive bearing 
on the preservation and conservation of animal in general. 
Mangena (2013:16) postulates that if one’s totem is nguruve (pig) one cannot 
therefore eat pig meat and this is meant not only to protect pig species from 
extinction through arbitrary killing for meat but also to show that pigs and human 
beings are related. Thus for a person of pig totem, eating pig meat will be more 
like eating oneself. It can therefore be argued that totemism does not only name or 
point to a natural relationship that exist between human beings and non-human 
animals, it also point to a spiritual relationship. For instance if one is of the pig, 
lion, elephant, fish and crocodile totems among others, then he or she will regard 
these animals as sacred and will treat them with reverence(ibid). Murove 
(2009:317) argues that the concept of Ukama provides the ethical anchorage for 
human social, spiritual and ecological togetherness. African environmental 
outlook rests on the sacredness of animals and other non-human components of 
nature so if the principle of totemism by and large advances the sacredness of 
nature then one can safely argue that totemism is indeed one of the pillars of 
African environmentalism. 
Abiola and Jeyifo (2010:23) concur with the above positions by arguing that 
totemism can be viewed as an elaborate, lived metaphor that serves to establish 
equivalences between heterogeneous modes of existence, the human and the non-
human. Junod in Grange (2015:6) in his ethnology studies of baPedi notes that 
totemism shows well one characteristic of the Bantu mind: the strong tendency to 
give a human soul to animals, to plants, to nature as such, a tendency which is at 
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the very root of the most beautiful blossom of poetry, a feeling that there is a 
community of substance between various forms of life. 
Chemhuru and Masaka (2010:130) assert that having noted the human propensity 
for abuse of non-human animals and the difficulty of reconciling the interest of 
humans with those of non-human animals, it can be argued that the concept of 
totem is a wildlife conservation strategy. What is interesting in this argument is 
that Africans realised that there is need for an environmental conservation 
strategy through indigenous knowledge systems such as totems before the advent 
of westernisation. This is so because totemism is part and parcel of the religious 
belief system of African people. This is very important in consolidating the 
position that African environmentalism is as old as humanity in traditional 
African communities and the fact that it was not written down like western 
discourses does not relegate the same to the intellectual outskirts. 
Boudillon in Chemhuru and Masaka (2010:131) argues that it is a taboo among 
the Shona, for one to eat one’s totem animal because one would lose one’ teeth. 
Because no one would want to lose his or her teeth, no one would eat the animal 
of his or her totem. Such a strategy could foster wildlife conservation. Duri and 
Mapara (2007:18) noted that taboos concerning totems were institutional wildlife 
conservation measures meant to preserve various animal species so that they 
could be saved from extinction due to unchecked hunting.  Mazrui in Murove 
(2004:208) stresses that a mind that does not see itself s part of the natural 
environment is susceptible to exploiting the natural environment for its own 
selfish ends. As opposed to such an environmentally exploitative mind, he says 
that the African mind is predisposed to ecological concern because of its totemic 
frame reference.  
Murove (2004:204) argues that the immortality of Ukama further advances 
Ukama between human beings and the natural world, whereby human identity is 
signifies in totemism, thus furthering Ukama between and the natural world. It is 
mainly for this reason that ancestorhood is not limited to the relations between 
humans and extends to other species of existence.  
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4.2.4. African traditional religion and forests and mountains 
The treatment of nature as sacred and religious among the traditional African 
society is not limited to land and animals. The same philosophy also extends to 
forest, trees, mountains and water bodies. Taringa (2006:208) argues that the 
Shona believes that certain forests and mountains are sacred. One major reason 
for this belief is that these places are burial sites of their chiefs. These places 
therefore are habitat of ancestral spirits. Access to natural resources in these 
forests is a special prerogative of the chiefly house. Access not sanctioned 
through ritual is dangerous because it may result in death (ibid). For instance, one 
of the weekly papers in Zimbabwe, the Manica Post of the week 6-12 August 
2004, carried the story of a 19-year-old girl Loveness Bhunu who disappeared in 
the sacred Nzunza Mountains. She had gone there to look for sweeping brooms. 
The story surrounding her disappearance is that she angered the spirits of the 
mountains by despising the size of the sweeping broom. A clear message from 
this incident is that the spirits in sacred places do not tolerate violation of religious 
beliefs. Mukanya in Chivaura (2005:234) asserts that before venturing out into 
world and tempering with the environment, the elders must give permission and 
perform appropriate rituals to carry out functions such as clearing the forest for 
farming, catching fish from the lakes for food or hunting animals for meat. In his 
research among the Korekore, a dialect of Shona, Gelfand in Taringa (2006:209) 
notes that so interesting is this feeling among the Shona that one entering a 
strange area in a forest, a mountain or a beautiful spot is not allowed to comment 
on it lest he or she upsets the ancestral spirits of the region.  
Kelbessa (2005:22) argues that in Ethiopia it is believed that some trees have a 
specific relationship with God and should not be touched by the axe. Individuals 
who violate this principle are morally wrong. Singer in Kelbessa (ibid) shares the 
same plate of opinion by arguing that religion was thought to provide a reason for 
doing what is right, the reason being that those who are virtuous will be regarded 
by an eternity of bliss while the rest roast in hell. Senghor in Murove (2004:209) 
writes that negro-African reasoning is intuitive by participation whereby the 
consciousness of the world and all that exist are united in an inseparable oneness. 
Chemhuru and Masaka (2010:128) assert that some sacred forest and mountains 
are reserved for certain Shona traditional ceremonies and relevant taboos help in 
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preserving them. Such taboos discourage people from visiting these sites thereby 
aiding the cause for a harmonious living between human beings and the whole of 
nature. This has gone a long way in maintaining the naturalness of sacred places 
compared to other areas deemed non-sacred because people have respect of these 
areas. 
Taringa (2006:201) postulate that among the Shona rocks, bodies of water and 
mountains are personified as living beings. For example before climbing a 
particular mountain or entering a particular forest one must ritually ask its 
permission. So, most aspects of nature are perceived as kin, endowed with 
consciousness and the power of ancestral spirits. Trees, animals, insects and 
plants are all to be approached with caution and consideration. This simply entails 
that Africans in general treat nature with reverence because nature points to their 
religion and philosophy. 
Taringa (ibid) postulates that in most African traditional societies, certain trees are 
considered sacred. People of Karanga, a dialect of Shona for instance believe that 
all large trees should not be cut because they belong to the ancestral spirits. 
Daneel (1991:99) argues that virtually all large trees were protected as they 
belonged to the ancestors who were believed to dwell in tree branches. Taringa 
(2006:209) postulates that the belief in ancestral spirits living in tree branches is 
also implied in death rituals. In the bringing-back-home-the-ancestors ritual some 
Shona use the branches of certain big trees. Such trees can only be cut with the 
ritual permission of the chief. What is important to note from this belief is that 
certain trees could be protected from being cut because of their significance in 
rituals. 
4.2.5. African traditional religion and water  
Water is one of the precious resources needed by both human beings and non-
human life. As a result, Africans want to keep water safe. Ogungbemi in Ojomo 
(2011:106) points that water is another natural resources that has been adversely 
affected in modern Africa through human activities. The deposition and dumping  
of toxic waste on the African coast and inland by industries both within and 
outside the continent, pollution of water through oil exploration and defacto 
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spillage, and through bacteriological and chemical agents like fertilizers have 
made our waters unsafe not only for humans but also other species in our waters. 
Among the Shona, water bodies are considered sacred because they are abode of 
animals associated with spirits. People should approach these water places 
carefully observing the taboos. For instance Taringa (2006:210) asserts that 
people should not use iron buckets to draw water from these places. They must 
use gourd, wooden or clay containers, which have not been used for cooking. The 
guardians of such water places and animals such as python and njuzu (water 
spirits). The Shona believe that these animals keep these waters on behalf of 
varipasi (underworld). Wrong doers may be drowned in the pool by these animals 
(ibid). Water from such sources is used for ritual purposes for example the Shona 
believe that it has healing powers, can be used by traditional healers to initiate 
spirit possessions and cooling avenging spirits. Some water sources are associated 
with a historical healing spirit medium. What this entail is that rivers, pools and 
other sources of water could be saved from unscrupulous human use simply 
because they are considered sacred and religious. 
4.2.6. African taboos and environmental ethics 
African environmentalism is hinged upon taboos. This means that traditional 
African people’s encounter with the environment (animals, trees, water) has been 
regulated by taboos. Taboos make part and parcel of the socio-cultural and 
religious life of the African people. Ezekwonna (2005:11) defined a taboo as 
prohibition against touching, saying, or doing something for fear of immediate 
harm from a mysterious supernatural force. Chemhuru and Masaka (2010:123) 
defined taboos as avoidance rules that forbid members of the human community 
from performing certain actions, such as eating some kinds of food, walking on or 
visiting some sites that are regarded as sacred, cruelty to non-human animals, 
using nature’s resources in an unsustainable manner. For the Shona people, taboos 
are understood as specific rules that forbid people from performing certain 
actions, otherwise the performance of such forbidden actions is a negation of the 
moral code that govern human conduct (Chemhuru and Masaka, 2010: 124). The 
violators of the Shona moral code as contained in taboos are said to invite 
misfortunes for the community and themselves, such as bad luck, disease, drought 
and death. Taboos refer to the sacred character of people and things, and the 
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uncleanness that follows violation of the prohibitions with which they are 
surrounded (Parrinder in Olabode and Siyanbola 2013:5). 
 
Chemhuru and Masaka (2010:125) postulate that Shona adherence to totem is one 
of the typical examples of the observance of taboos. For example if a person 
belongs to the clan of vaera nzou (those that must not eat the elephant meat) then 
he is prohibited from eating these non-human animals. It becomes part of that 
person’s ethos to avoid taking elephants as a source of meat. For the Shona people 
going against such prohibitions invites illness or the loss of the offender’s teeth. 
Totemism is important in extending some moral considerations to non-human 
animals. 
Tatira in Chemhuru and Masaka (2010:124 rightly notes that the Shona people 
realise the importance of preserving the environment as a factor of overall 
development. This knowledge is manifested in some of the taboos that control 
child behaviour in relation the environment. Thus Shona taboos are ethical tools 
that do not only foster good human relations, but also promote good relations 
between human being and nature. Workineh (2002:54) argues that the Oromo 
worldview regulates the freedom of human beings in their dealing with nature. 
Thus, the Oromo worldview has fostered a responsible attitude towards nature, 
plants and animals. The essence of this view is to live in partnership with the 
natural environment. 
Apart from being a source of environmental ethics, Shona taboos signify a 
concept of wholeness between human beings, the community and the 
environment. Ramose in Chemhuru and Masaka (2010:125) asserts that the 
principle of wholeness applies also with regard to the relation between human 
beings and the physical or objective nature. To care for one another, therefore 
implies caring for the physical nature as well. Without such care the 
interdependence between human beings and the physical nature would be 
undermined. Furthermore, there are also in Africa taboos which deal with 
environmental health, and as Agbola and Mabawonku (1996: 79) inform us, 
elaborate religious rituals and taboos are used extensively in African traditional 
society to sustain the environment and keep it from all disease vectors. 
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Writing on Shona water taboos, Chemhuru and Masaka (2010:126) notes that in 
Shona ukachera mvura nechirongo chitema, tsime rinopwa which means if you 
fetch water with a sooty black pot, the well will dry up. Although it is clear that 
the purpose of this particular taboo was to instil the culture of hygiene in public 
water sources, the Shona’s explanation of this taboo is that sooty black pot would 
cause a well to quickly dry up. Since water is considered precious, no one would 
want to contribute to the drying up of the well by violating the taboo (ibid). 
Adherence to this taboo would therefore guarantee safe water for the entire 
community. Bujo in Kelbessa (2010:469) notes that the African is convinced that 
all things in the cosmos are interconnected. All natural forces depend on each 
other, so that human beings can live in harmony only in and with the whole of 
nature. 
Chemhuru and Masaka (2010:127) further postulates that an analysis of Shona 
environmental taboos show that deterrence is used as a way of safeguarding their 
observance as ethical tools that promotes sustainable use of nature’s resources. 
For example, in the taboo that discourages use of sooty black pot to draw water 
from the well because it will dry up, individuals are frightened that their water 
source will dry up although one cannot scientifically prove the claim. 
Another taboo that discourages the abuse of water sources is ukawetera munvura 
unozoita chirwere chehozwe meaning if you urinate in water you will suffer from 
bilharzias (ibid). In this taboo fear of contracting the disease deter people from 
urinating in water thereby polluting the water. Tangwa (2006:392) notes that as 
human beings, we carry on our shoulders, the whole weight of moral 
responsibility and obligation for the whole world. 
 Duri and Mapara (2007:15) argue that institutional prohibitions, such as taboos 
were designed to develop positive societal attitudes towards the environment. 
This also involved restricting the cutting and using of certain types of vegetation. 
These prohibitions were/are a way of preserving nature. Ogungbemi (1997:204) 
argues that in our traditional relationship with nature, man and woman recognise 
the importance of water, land and air management. To our traditional 
communities the ethics of not taking more than you need from nature is a moral 
code. Perhaps this explains why earth, forests, rivers and wind and other natural 
objects are traditionally believed to be both natural and divine. 
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Chemhuru and Masaka (2010:128) argues that the Shona recognises the 
interconnectedness and coexistence between people and natural vegetation and 
wildlife in so far as playing a crucial role in the sustenance of human life. 
According to Shona belief systems, some sacred sites, such as mountains have 
symbolic importance. For instances it is believed that these sacred mountains 
developed some natural fires as a way of informing people of the advent of the 
rainy season. 
Another taboo that prohibits the cutting down of trees is that ukatema muhacha, 
mvura haizonayi which means if you cut down the muhacha tree it will not rain. 
Chemhuru and Masaka (2010:129) assert that this taboo is based on the 
understanding that the muhacha tree is an important fruit tree that produces fruits 
that are very nutritional to both human beings and animals especially in times of 
drought where there will be a shortage of food. Duri and Mapara (2007:22) argues 
that taboos like that of the cutting down of muhacha tree is still effective up until 
contemporary times because the Shona people believe that life should be 
respected, especially that of little non-human creatures that depend on wild fruits 
for nourishment. 
Chemhuru and Masaka (2010:132) postulate that another Shona taboo that 
prohibits cruelty to animal species is ukauraya mutsumwatsumwa, n’ombe dzako 
dzinozotsemuka minyatso which means if you kill a praying mantis, your cows 
will crack their teats. Cows are an important measure of wealth among the Shona 
because they provide milk, meat and are used in paying lobola. Koenane (2014:3) 
argues that wealth/maruo as Sesotho referred to being blessed with resources such 
as land, cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, chickens and many other animals which 
characterised one as having plenty. The cow is not owned but only allows its 
products to be used for the enhancement of human life for everyone in the 
community. As a result, no one would want to risk losing his cows by killing a 
praying mantis. 
 
4.3. African proverbs and environmental ethics 
As part of African people’s language and oral tradition, proverbs have also been 
used to carry environmental messages. Ekwealo (2014:199) postulates that 
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proverbs are a medium for disseminating, worldview and philosophy especially in 
Africa. They are a condensed metaphysical system from which anything about 
reality could be alembicated. Thus to be in the ancient African system is to be in 
proverbs. Explaining the importance of proverbs, Achebe (2008:6) stated that 
among the Ibos, the art of conversation is regarded very highly and proverbs are 
palm oil with which words are eaten. 
Olabode and Siyanbola (2013:8) postulate that another proverb among the Yoruba 
of Nigeria that relates to environmental sanitation is: Ti a ba gaba ile, ti aba gba 
ita, akitan ni a dari re si. This means that if we sweep both inside and outside of a 
house, we dump the refuse into a refuse dump. The proverb is pointing to the 
importance of dumping refuse in the appropriate places. This, if done will prevent 
various diseases and afflictions associated with refuse. In actual fact this proverb 
affects mostly urban dwellers where residents usually dumped refuses 
indiscriminately even in cases where government made available facilities for 
refuse dump. What this entails is that Africans have knowledge of sanitation and 
environmental well-being as constituted in proverbs. The advantage of African 
environmentalism enshrined in proverbs is that it will be passed from generation 
to generation through oral tradition. This will guarantee the survival of African 
environmental ethics in the future. 
 
Ekwealo (2014:200) further asserts that the first proverb that introduces 
environmental consciousness is that Uwa mmadu na uwa mmuo bu ofu meaning 
that it is the same stream of life that encompasses the world of humans and the 
world of spirits. This ecological emphasis serves as the background ecological 
wisdom that reminds everyone about the universality of all consciousness and the 
harmony of the universe, for it also introduces the relationship of the celestial and 
terrestrial worlds. 
 
Ekwealo (ibid) points that another proverb in which plants are used says ‘those 
whose palm kernel were cracked for them by a benevolent spirit should not forget 
be humble. Such proverbs which involve plants show that the relationship 
between the human and plants are normal affairs. 
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4.4. Ubuntu and environmental ethics 
On Ubuntu, Ramose in Metz (2010:331) points that to be a human being is to 
affirm one’s humanity by recognising the humanity of others and, on that basis, 
establish humane relations with them. One is enjoined, yes, commanded as it 
were, to actually become a human. This proposition breathes a communitarian 
spirit because it is in strict sense centralising the notion one cannot realise his or 
her humanness without incorporating the humanness of others. 
Grange (2015:304) points that Ubuntu is a concept that is derived from proverbial 
expression (aphorisms) found in several languages in Africa South of the Sahara. 
However, it is not only a linguistic concept but a normative connotation 
embodying how we ought to relate to the other- what our moral obligations is 
towards the other (both human and non-human). Lenka Bula (2008:378) argues 
that Sesotho aphorism motho ke motho ka botho ba bang literally translates as ‘no 
person is complete in him/herself, she or he is fully human in as far as far as she 
or he remain a part of the web of life, including creation and the universe. 
Metz and Gaie (2010:75) argue that  morality in Africa South of the Sahara (as 
embodied in Ubuntu) is distinct from Western approaches to morality in the sense 
that sub Saharan morality is essentially rational in the sense that the only way to 
develop one’s humanness is to relate to others in a positive way. In other words, 
one becomes a person solely through other persons- one cannot realise one’s true 
self in opposition to others or even in isolation from them. This simply entails the 
communitarian nature of Ubuntu. It is through this communitarian nature of 
African that their environmentalism is embedded. 
In his account of Ubuntu as a moral theory, Metz (2010:333) postulates that “an 
action is right just insofar as it is in solidarity with groups whose survival is 
threatened; an act is wrong to the extent that it fails to support a vulnerable 
community. Taking this notion from an African environmental point of view, it 
entails that all efforts by Africans to conserve and preserve the environment are 
by and large right because they are in solidarity with environmental principles of 
a community, a community that is being threatened by climatic changes, 
deforestation and pollution, making it vulnerable to severe environmental 
degradation. 
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Grange (2015:305) further postulates that African morality differs from an 
Aristotelian or other Western moral philosophy in that it defines positive 
relationship with others in strictly communal terms, the proper way to relate to 
others, for one  large part of sub-Saharan thinking, is to seek out community or to 
line in harmony with them. What is crucial for the researchers to note from this 
submission is that harmony and relations in the community is central. It is from 
this harmony among individuals in the community that will translate into 
harmony with nature.   
In showing the relationship between Ubuntu and African environmentalism, 
Ekwealo (2014:199) argues that while some critics may argue to contrary on 
Ubuntu’s ecological spirit, the ethical implications of Ubuntu can still be seen to 
have ecocentric implications. This is because the values it promotes when taken to 
their fullest cannot really be in defence of human beings alone. It shares in the 
universal essence contained in the African metaphysical and epistemological 
meaning of force or spirit which links up humans, animals, plants, and the so 
called inanimate. Etieyibo (2011:125-127) concurs with the above position by 
arguing that because Ubuntu has these values, it fosters among other things the 
attitude of a shared concern as well as collaboration and solidarity because it is 
concerned with collective well-being, it does not commodify and monetize the 
natural environment. Individuals basically think about communal well-being, 
Ubuntu’s values of caring and sharing clearly encourage the development of a 
non-exploitative attitude towards the environment, an attitude that if cultivated by 
all will leave the world more sustainable it currently is 
Murove (2009:316) argues that Ubuntu (humanness) is the concrete form of 
Ukama (relatedness) in the sense that human interrelationships within society are 
a microcosm of the relationality within the universe. Suffice to say this 
relationship between humans and humans, humans and nature is the cornerstone 
of African environmental ethics in the sense that relationships go hand-in-hand 
with respect. This therefore entails that through Ubuntu and Ukama, Africans 
approach nature with respect and dignity.  
Writing about the Shona people of Chief Norumedzo in Masvingo Province, 
Zimbabwe, Mawere (2012:110) argues that both locals and strangers are 
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constantly advised by the chief through headman and village policeman not to 
tamper with it as tampering with the jiri is believed to anger ancestors who in turn 
might cause harurwa (sting bugs) extinction and the mizhanje trees not to produce 
fruit. It is during the exploitation of resources from jiri that the exploiters should 
demonstrate their highest level of ubuntu to the environment-locally known as 
hunhu (humanness). 
Writing on the negative effects of failing to uphold Ubuntu by the Shona people 
in Mukanganwi area in Masvingo Province, Zimbabwe, Mawere (2012:111) noted 
that while natural phenomena can be partly blamed for the erratic rainfall in 
Mukanganwi over the past few decades, human causes like deforestation and veld 
fires seen to be significantly contributing to the climatic changes in the area. In 
fact it can be inferred that reluctance on the deployment of Ubuntu in people’s 
relations with natural environment has compromised the rainfall pattern over the 
years. Kaoma (2010:121) concurs with this notion hence he argues that Africans 
understand that abundant life depends on how humanity relates with non human 
beings. A person with Ubuntu cannot mistreat non-humans or destroy earth. 
Lamenting on the lack of Ubuntu Mawere (2012:112) argues that the colonial 
Zimbabwean government, instead of seeking ways to merge the local people’s 
Ubuntu embedded in their indigenous knowledge systems with expert science in 
the national conservation project, it despised and castigated to the dustbin of 
oblivion all conservation practices embedded in Indigenous knowledge systems. 
By default or otherwise it failed to realise that Ubuntu as a philosophy of life of 
the local people- the Shona, was rich system that the bearers had used successful 
for centuries now in conserving the natural environment.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Mawere (2012:9) argues that in some parts of Southern Zimbabwe the philosophy 
of Ubuntu is still used in small scale environment conservation projects and with 
visible consequences to the environment. Where the philosophy of Ubuntu still 
prevails, the consequences are positive and otherwise in those areas where the 
philosophy has lost its grip. 
4.5. African morality and environmental ethics 
The concept of morality is significant to African communitarianism. Maina 
(2008:196) argues that from Bujo’s perspective an individual person in an African 
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society is required to fully interiorise the ethical demands of the community. 
These ethical demands include the integration of the ancestral norms by every 
member. As a result, it has also been considered as a springboard for African 
environmentalism. This entails that one can have an appreciation of African 
environmental outlook by looking at how Africans’ understanding of what is right 
and wrong. 
Kelbessa (2005:24) points that the Oromo moral code does not allow 
irresponsible exploitation of resource and human beings. In this case, then it can 
be argued that the Oromo conception of saffuu is based on justice. It reflects a 
deep respect and balance between varying things. The Oromo do not simply 
consider justice, integrity and respect as human virtues applicable to human 
beings but they extend them to non human species and mother earth. This simply 
shows that environmental consciousness among Africans stems from their moral 
worldview. 
Bujo in Ugwuanyi (2005:6) argues that in Africa morality is grounded in a form 
of communitarianism which to a larger extent is a man-centred ideology. Metz 
(2007:15) asserts that an action is right in so far as it promotes a shared identity 
among people grounded on good-will, an act is wrong to the extent that it fails to 
do so and leads to encourage the opposite and ill-will. What is important to note 
from Metz’s position is that when he say an action is right in so far as it promotes 
shared identity, he does not only refer to human beings, rather he includes non-
human components of nature. 
Writing about environmental ethics through African moral world, Ugwuanyi 
(2005:6) argues that it should be supposed that since the environment is meant to 
serve as a moral support then it should be treated as such. It is clearly wrong to 
except a good from an environment that has been badly treated. Such terms of 
reciprocity are what the African moral world demands. Thus it is totally wrong 
and contrary to an African environmental world if the source of ill-will and 
discord finds its root in the resources of the environment because by doing so, the 
environment is negative or destructive moral agent. 
Kaoma (2010:120) notes that indeed the Bantu moral conscience promotes 
recognition of the harmony and interaction of forces and respecting them. As 
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Placide Tempels observed, the Bantu have a notion of what we may call 
immanent justice, which they would translate to mean that, to violate nature 
incurs her vengeance and that misfortune springs from her. They know that he 
who does not respect the laws of nature becomes a person whose inmost being is 
pregnant with misfortune. This ethical conscience of theirs is at one point 
philosophical, moral and juridical. 
4.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter the researcher has managed to show the significant relationship 
between African communitarianism and environmental ethics. The researcher 
qualifies the relationship as significant because Africans can think and formulate 
a policy and strategy of African environmental solutions to African environmental 
problems basing on the fact that African culture breathes an environmental spirit. 
African traditional religion, Ubuntu, proverbs and African morality are the facets 
of African communitarianism that has been discussed side by side with 
environmental ethics. On African traditional religion the researcher has found that 
generally Africans believe in a supernatural Being who they believe manifest 
through nature. This religious belief explains why certain trees, mountains, rivers, 
animals are considered sacred. It is because of the religious nature of traditional 
African people that creation myths, taboos, totems assist in the interpretation of 
African environmentalism. Taboos and totems have been found very 
environmentally friendly in traditional African scheme of things because they 
prohibit bad encounter with nature and render certain totemic animals sacred. 
Creation myths point to a mutual relationship between humans and non-humans 
in the ancient time. 
This discussion would have been a half-backed intellectual cake if it fails to show 
at all costs the connection among African morality, Ubuntu and environmental 
ethics. To this, it has been observed that morality in an African understanding is 
viewed in form of communitarianism. As a result, it embraces demands of the 
community including non-human components of nature. Considerable literature 
has also been supplied in this discussion to show that Ubuntu is the springboard 
for African environmentalism. To augment the claim that oral tradition has an 
important role in African people’s lives, it has also been noted that proverbs are 
an indigenous linguistic vehicle for environmental messages. Drawing examples 
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from Yoruba and Ibos of Nigeria, it has been shown in this discussion that 
proverbs depict the relationship between human beings and nature. 
 Taking into consideration the above discussion one can therefore argue that 
Africans should not bury their religion and culture if they want to successfully 
win the war against environmental crisis. Using indigenous knowledge systems 
such as discussed above is another reliable way to conserve and preserve nature 
for today and for future generations.   
The next chapter seeks to provide a summary of the research, evaluations and 
recommendations for the next research. 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
 5. EVALUATON AND SUMMARY 
In this dissertation the researcher has given a critical analysis of the African 
environmental ethic or policy to salvage rampant environmental problems 
affecting the continent. The thrust of the research is premised on the realisation 
that Western environmental ethical theories have proved to be too anthropocentric 
to an extent that they have not been significantly instrumental in curbing 
environmental problems particularly in Africa. As a result, this research emerged 
to close the knowledge gap that exist between Western environmental ethics and 
African environmentalism by arguing that it is possible to formulate an 
environmental ethic hinged on African communitarianism. Why African 
communitarianism? The researcher feels that African communitarianism is a 
theory to go by because it is a theory that reflects African philosophy through 
religion, morality, Ubuntu and the interdependence and interrelatedness of 
African people with the natural world. 
In chapter one, the researcher has provided background information to the study, 
problem statement, research aims and objectives, rationale and   research 
methodology. In this chapter, the researcher has also managed to have an 
appreciation of some of environmental problems affecting African nations. These 
include deforestation, water and air pollution, land degradation, global warming 
and climatic change. The researcher has observed that most of these ecological 
problems are mainly caused by poverty, ignorance, industrialisation and 
technological advancement as well as rapacious and desire for economic growth.  
The researcher managed in chapter one to provide introductory remarks on 
African environmental philosophies of thinkers like Ogungbemi, Tangwa and 
Ugwuanyi. Ogungbemi alludes that in the traditional African society, people 
recognise the importance of water, land and air. For Ogungbemi, the ethics of not 
taking more than one needs from nature is a moral code in the traditional African 
scheme of things. This explains why earth, forests, rivers and wind and other 
natural objects are traditionally held to be both natural and divine. What this entail 
is that there is interdependence and interconnectedness between African people 
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and nature. This relationship shaped the attitude, behaviour and contact of African 
people with nature.   
 Tangwa bases his African environmentalism conception on metaphysical outlook 
of pre-colonial African societies which he called eco-bio-communitarianism. This 
metaphysical worldview entails the recognition and acceptance of inter-
dependence and peaceful coexistence between earth, plants, animals and humans. 
Such metaphysical worldview underpinned and undergird the ways, manners and 
cosmically between humans and his fellow humans. Tangwa further emphasise 
that within traditional African worldview, the difference between plants, and 
inanimate things, between the sacred and the profane, matter and spirit, the 
communal and the individual is a slim and flexible. By this, Tangwa simply 
reinforces the view that pre-colonial African setting, through its religion and 
communitarian rootedness and orientation, co-exist peacefully with the rest of 
nature.  
Using the case study of the Nso people in Cameroon, Tangwa argues that the Nso 
attitude toward nature and the rest of creation is that of reverential co-existence, 
conciliation and containment and he observes that there are frequent offerings of 
sacrifices to God, to the divine Spirits, both benevolent and malevolent, to the 
departed ancestors and to the sundry invisible and inscrutable forces of nature. 
This shows the connection that exists between African religion and the 
environment. This bond is very significant in the sense that it shapes African 
people’s attitude towards nature. Sacred and religious animals, mountains, rivers 
escape destructive human interference because they are considered spiritual and 
divine. 
Ugwuanyi attempted advancing environmental ethics through the African 
worldview. For him African religion and morality forms the base of African 
environmentalism. Ugwuanyi argues that it should be supposed that since the 
environment is meant to serve as a moral support then it should be treated as such 
For Ugwuanyi, it is clearly wrong to except a good from an environment that has 
been badly treated. Such terms of reciprocity are what the African moral world 
demands.  
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On the relationship between African traditional religion and environment, 
Ugwuanyi argues that symbols, which forms part of African religion are formed 
from trees or moulded from the earth hence they generally find their origin in the 
environment. These Philosophers are credited for significantly contributing to the 
discourse of African environmental ethics. In their understanding of 
environmental philosophy from an African point of view, these Philosophers 
share in common the notion that African traditional society has a sound 
environmental disposition of interdependence and coexistence with nature. The 
trio’s environmental philosophies are by and large microcosm of the macrocosm 
of an environmental ethic anchored on African communitarianism. 
In chapter two, the researcher discussed the conceptualisation of the concept of 
African communitarianism as espoused by Placide Tempels, John Mbiti, Ifeanyi 
Menkiti, Kwame Gyekye and Masolo. Placide Tempels through his vital force 
thesis holds that the Bantu human person is a living force which needs to interact 
with other persons for it to realise complete life. Tempels argues that the vital 
force that is found in a person, as an individual, comes more to life fulfilment or 
realisation when that individual engages in relations with his adjoining 
environment. He relates to the supernatural world, to his fellow human beings and 
to inanimate things. What is more important to note from Tempels’ submission is 
that, an individual should not only relate to his fellow human beings but to the 
supernatural world and inanimate things. This straightforwardly indicates African 
environmentalism in the sense that through religion certain animals, mountains 
and forests are considered sacred and divine. The relationship with inanimate 
things which Tempels alludes to mirrors interdependence, coexistence and 
interconnectedness between, humans and nature, humans and the supernatural as 
well as nature and the supernatural.  
For Tempels, communitarian morality is of utmost significance if a person needs 
to be accepted in the African society. The African communitarian society has no 
place and space for individuals who violate the moral values of the community. It 
is the existence of the moral principle which makes it easier to construct an 
African environmental ethic because a morally upright individual relates well 
with nature and the rest of creation. 
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In his version of communitarianism, Tempels also discussed the concept of 
African names given to babies at birth. To this, Tempels argues that names in the 
traditional African thought are not just names like John and Marry as it is in 
Western society. In traditional African thought, names carry socio-cultural and 
religious messages of a people. In most cases in Africa, a child is given a name of 
a deceased relative in the clan. This shows the relationship between the dead and 
the living. Such relationship is very significant because it shows the religious 
nature of African people. This religious orientation through names points to 
African environmentalism. 
 Mbiti begun by discussing tribal nature of traditional African society arguing that 
tribes have distinct religious beliefs to which they identify themselves with. 
Tribes form communitarian societies and it is in these communities that a morally 
and religious environmentalism is enshrined. This is made possible because 
people of the same tribe are bound by same religion, same principles guiding and 
regulating morality and more importantly, they share the same taste of how an 
individual is conceived in an African society. They are also bound to share how a 
person has to relate with nature. 
Mbiti also postulates that in the traditional African society, kinship system 
regulate the life of all members of the tribe. The entire tribe was tied to this 
kinship system. For Mbiti the kinship system is like a vast network stretching to 
accommodate everyone in the tribe. This entails that each and every member of 
the tribal group is related and no individual is treated as alien. Such societal 
setting contributes to the establishment of a communitarian society with a shared 
identity. Once a society becomes communitarian, one can therefore argue that 
such a society has similar religion, morality and a similar environmental outlook.  
For Mbiti, the kinship system is not merely limited to the relationships of people 
who are living but, it also extends to include those who have passed on in life and 
those who are yet to be born. This is the onto-triadic nature of African ontology.  
The living has a duty towards the dead, to keep their little soul alive and offer 
libations for it. This point to a religious nature of Africans and it is very necessary 
to indicate that the offering of libation and other religious rituals done for the dead 
are carried using branches of certain trees. These rituals are carried on graves 
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which are on land. What this entails apart from showing that Africans are 
religious people is that African religion is inseparable from the surrounding 
natural environment. This automatically contributes to a positive attitude towards 
the environment because certain trees are considered sacred because they are used 
in performing rituals and the fact that land carries graves makes it divine. 
 For Mbiti the society contributes in shaping the humanness of an individual who 
cannot exist alone except with others members of the clan or society. This implies 
that the community can ensure that a harmonious relationship among members of 
the society as well as between humans and nature is maintained. For Mbiti, 
physical birth is not enough to identify a person. An individual has to be 
incorporated through rites and rituals to be identified as a person. 
Menkiti concurs with other African Philosophers in the conception of a person in 
the African thought. Like Mbiti, Menkiti argues that a person in African thought 
is not defined by physical or psychological characteristics rather a person is 
defined by his or her relation to the environing community because communal 
realities takes precedence over individual’s history and experiences. If this is the 
case then, it is logical therefore to argue that the traditional African community 
makes sure that conservative and preservative environmental taboos, laws and 
regulations are observed in the best interest of the entire community. Failure to 
abide with societal norms renders an individual an incomplete person. 
Menkiti also discusses the significance of rites and rituals which incorporates a 
person to become a complete person who is socially accepted in the community. 
The long process of social and ritual transformation entails that the community 
has a special role in nurturing an individual because without other members of the 
community one cannot go through social transformation. It is through these rites 
of passages and rituals that an individual becomes aware of the religious, social, 
political, moral and more significantly, environmental expectations of a particular 
community.  
Menkiti argues that for one to be considered a full person that particular 
individual should exhibit unquestionable moral worth. To this, Menkiti argues 
that the community has got a role in prescribing certain norms to the individual. 
The individual may not question these societal prescriptions if he or she is to 
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become a fully recognised person in their respective communities. Thus, as far as 
African societies are concerned, personhood is something at which individuals 
can fail. For Menkiti, the traditional African society has no place and space for an 
immoral and evil person. A virtuous or generous person is considered a full 
person with great importance in the society. Evil and self-centred or immoral 
people contribute nothing to society hence Menkiti thinks they are not persons. 
Menkiti argues that in Africa, personhood is not automatically granted at birth but 
is acquired as one gets along in society. This getting along in society takes quite a 
lot of time, usually being attained by people who are of advanced age. These 
people, who are much older according to Menkiti, had the time to learn what it 
means to be a person through accumulation of knowledge of social values and 
norms that govern their particular society. By living up to, and adhering to these 
norms, they become successful in living up to the standard of personhood hence 
significantly contributing to the preservation of socio-cultural values of a 
particular society. 
Gyekye stands for a different version of African communitarianism. Though he 
concedes that the individual is understood as part of the bigger community, he 
accuses Mbiti and Menkiti for coming up with what he termed radical 
communitarianism which according to him does not recognise the issue of 
individual autonomy and rights. For Gyekye, individual autonomy and rights 
should not be compromised at the expense of the community. Gyekye’s moderate 
communitarianism constitutes rights and freedom, the community of mutuality, 
the common good, and the principle of reciprocity as well as responsibility as a 
principle of morality. For Gyekye, communitarianism views the community as a 
reality in itself and not as a mere relationship of individuals. A community in the 
context of communitarianism is seen as a group of persons linked by interpersonal 
bonds, which are not necessarily biological, who consider themselves primarily as 
members of a group and who share common goals, values and interests. 
Stressing the significance of morality in his version of moderate 
communitarianism, Gyekye notes that the Akan conceptualisation of person, 
which is communalistic, would categorize someone who chooses to lead lonely 
lifestyles as non-person. An individual who exhibits morally blameworthy 
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conduct is also branded as a non-person. He says for the communitarians, 
personhood is earned in the moral arena and not just handed over to the individual 
at birth 
In his version of moderate communitarianism, Gyekye elaborates what he calls 
the idea of common good. By common good Gyekye meant those universal 
enviable things needed for the normal function of an individual within a society. 
Relating this concept of common good to environmentalism one can argue that 
the community shares the common environmental good that the welfare of natural 
environmental is of great importance. 
As part of his moderate communitarianism, Gyekye discusses the significance of 
the principle of reciprocity. Gyekye claims that the  communitarian moral and 
political theory, which considers the community as a elementary human good, 
advocates a life lived in agreement and collaboration with other, a life of mutual 
consideration and aid and of interdependence, a life in which one shares in the 
fate of another individual. For Gyekye, this kind of life, that is life of mutual 
consideration and aid and of interdependence is very rewarding and fulfilling.  
Gyekye maintains that the communitarian ethic acknowledges the importance of 
individual rights but that it does not do so to the detriment of responsibilities 
which the individual member have ought to have towards the community or other 
members of the community. What this simply entails is that the individual cannot 
pursue individual goals which are outside the communal moral and social dictates. 
 Masolo’s version of African communitarianism also acknowledges that the 
community and the individual cannot be conceived separately and the welfare, 
moral demands and expectations of the community takes precedence over those of 
the individual. Masolo discusses the significance of initiation ceremonies in 
imparting important social and cultural knowledge in traditional African setting. 
Masolo argues that the period of seclusion in the forest gives society the space 
and time to cultivate and groom the person in manners that embodies the 
fundamentally philanthropic impulse underlining social being. It is this altruistic 
character that will enable an individual to share whatever one has with other 
members of a community.  
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What makes Masolo’ version of African communitarian ethic different from those 
of other philosophers is that it encompasses the modern African society. In this 
regard, Masolo managed to depict that contemporary Africans are sharing 
personal economic gains with other members of the community. Such works of 
charity and benevolence are made possible because modern Africans are 
conscious of the communitarian philosophy.  
All these aspects as discussed in chapter two provide a clear understanding of a 
person in relation to the community in the African socio-ethical thought. These 
thinkers agree that the individual in the African communitarianism cannot be 
understood outside the community. The individual cannot exist without other 
members. A person becomes a full person because of interaction with other 
members of the community. 
In chapter three, the researcher discussed the traditional Western environmental 
ethical theories. These include land ethic, deep ecology, ecofeminism and social 
ecology. To begin with, Aldo Leopold’s land ethic states that an interaction with 
nature is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the 
biotic community and is wrong when it tends otherwise. For Leopold, human 
beings should seek to coexist with nature and the rest of creation such as animals, 
rocks, plants and water. This entail that human interaction with nature is justified 
only if it does not cause harm to the same. 
Critiques of Leopold’s land ethic argues that the employment of the term 
‘stability’ poses problem in the sense that it can be mistaken to mean that the 
natural environment is static and stagnant. Nature goes through stages such as 
reproduction and adaptability to different weather conditions. More to that, other 
environmental hazards such as floods and earthquakes threatens other species of 
the natural ecosystem. In this case it does not sound well to consider nature as 
stable. 
Arne Naess’s deep ecology entails that nature should be allowed to grow for it has 
inherent value in itself. From a deep ecologist point of view, well-being and 
flourishing of human and non-human life on earth have value in themselves. 
Humans have no right to reduce the sumptuousness and diversity of nature except 
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to satisfy basic needs. Deep ecology further discusses that human population 
should decrease in order to ease pressure on the natural environment. 
Like any other environmental theory, deep ecology has also been found with 
shortfalls.  The idea of reducing population as a measure to ease pressure on the 
environment probably works in Western communities and not in Africa where the 
population is increasing because people believe in more than one child. 
Furthermore, Social ecologist has criticised deep ecology for reducing humans 
from complex beings to mere species of part and parcel of the universe. 
Ecofeminism is the belief that there is a strong historical, causal, and theoretical 
connection between the oppression of women and the oppression of the 
environment. For ecological feminists, man dominates women the same way 
nature has been dominated by people. As a result feminists believe that one 
cannot end the exploitation of nature without ending human oppression and vice 
versa. 
To augment their position, feminist such as Warren, Plumwood, Ruether and 
many others assert that women are in a better position than men to relate with 
nature, that they are in fact closer to nature. These are the proponents of the body-
based argument which claim that women, through their unique bodily experiences 
like ovulation, menstruation, pregnancy, child birth and breast feeding- are closer 
to and can more readily connect with nature. They also argue that because women 
are responsible for household duties they are closely connected to nature because 
the walk long distances to fetch firewood and water. 
Critiques of ecofeminism argue that the allegation that without liberating women 
from male domination, efforts to liberate nature from human oppression will 
remain a utopia is not true. This is because it is argued that there is a clear cut line 
between feminist movement and ecological concerns. For instance, a society can 
come to a realisation that it has to treat nature properly for the continuity of its life 
without paying attention to feminist ideologies. Furthermore, the submission that 
women are closer to nature because of their unique body experience has been 
attacked. To this, anti-ecological feminists argue that although men do not 
menstruate, bear children, or breastfeed, they do share all other human biological 
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processes such as eating, sleeping, eliminating wastes, getting sick and dying. In 
addition in their ejaculation of semen they have experiences of a tangible stuff of 
the reproduction of life. Furthermore, if child bearing or breastfeeding is what 
attunes women to nature, are women who do not experience these biological 
processes any less connected to nature. Failure to get answers to all the raised 
questions renders ecofeminism a weak theory to depend on in our search for a 
lasting solution to environmental problems. 
Bookchin’s social ecology theory suggests that environmental problems are 
directly related to social problems. In particular Bookchin claims that the 
hierarchies of power rampant within modern societies have promoted a 
hierarchical relationship between humans and natural world. Bookchin further 
argues that humans must recognise that they are part of nature, not different or 
separate from it. Human societies and human relations with nature can be 
informed by the non-hierarchical associations found within the natural world. For 
example, Bookchin points out that within an ecosystem, there is no species more 
important than another, instead interactions are mutualistic and interconnected. 
This interdependence and lack of hierarchy in nature, it is alleged, provides a 
scheme for a non-hierarchical human society. 
One of the problems with social ecology is that are there examples of non-
hierarchical societies that have no ecological problems at all? Failure by 
Bookchin to provide such evidence based on anthropological and historical 
research conclusion renders social ecology weak environmental theory. This 
simply entails that Bookchin misrepresented the causal link between societal 
structures and environmental exploitation. Social ecology has also been criticised 
for being anthropocentric because in his account, Bookchin talks of the liberation 
of both humans and nature. This liberation process needs human beings to 
facilitate it. 
Of interest to note is that the researcher observed that in as much as these theories 
differ in terms of their articulations concerning the relationship between humans 
and the environment, they share common ground. For instance, all these theories 
agree that human interaction with nature is the root cause of all environmental 
problems. These theories also concur that nature should be preserved for its own 
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good and to achieve this, human being are duty-bound to conserve and preserve 
nature. This shows that these theories constitute the major aspects that 
underpinned environmental debate in the Western societies. However, these 
theories have been criticised for their shortfalls. Most of them have been found to 
be anthropocentric. This means that they fail to attach inherent or intrinsic value 
to non-human things. 
 In chapter four the researcher managed to show the significant connection 
between African communitarianism and environmental ethics. The researcher 
thinks that the relationship is very significant because it can provide Africans and 
non-Africans with a theoretical framework upon which they can formulate a 
policy and strategy to provide African solutions to African environmental 
problems. The argument emanates from the fact that African culture breathes an 
environmental spirit. African traditional religion, Ubuntu, proverbs and African 
morality are the facets of African communitarianism which has been discussed 
side by side with environmental ethics. 
 On African traditional religion, the researcher has found that generally Africans 
believe in a supernatural Being who they believe manifest through nature. This 
religious belief explains why certain trees, mountains, rivers, animals are 
considered sacred. It is because of the religious nature of traditional African 
people that creation myths, taboos, totems assist in the interpretation of African 
environmentalism. 
Creation myths point to a mutual relationship between humans and non-humans 
in the ancient African time. It has been observed that most creation myths involve 
God, human beings land, animals, mountains and forests. This cosmic relationship 
between the supernatural, human beings and the environment shaped African 
people’s understanding of traditional religion as well as their encounter with 
nature.  
Taboos play a fundamental role in traditional African environmentalism. As 
prohibitive and avoidance rules, Taboos have ensured that public water sources, 
particular animals and trees are safe from human destruction. Fear of making a 
well to dry if one uses a pot with black soot and causing no rain by cutting a 
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muhacha tree have regulated the behaviour of African towards nature.  Totems 
have been found very environmentally friendly in traditional African scheme of 
things. Totemic animals are considered sacred and cannot be killed for meat. If a 
person is of the elephant totem, he or she considers the same to be sacred. 
Totemism also shows the relationship between human beings and the 
environment.  
The researcher has also discussed in chapter four, the relationship between 
African morality and environmental ethics. To this, it has been observed that 
morality in an African understanding is viewed in form of communitarianism. As 
a result, it embraces demands of the community including non-human 
components of nature. A morally upright individual cannot ill-treat animals and 
other components of natural environment. 
Ugwuanyi argues that it should be supposed that since the environment is meant 
to serve as a moral support then it should be treated as such. It is clearly wrong to 
except a good from an environment that has been badly treated. Such terms of 
reciprocity are what the African moral world demands. Thus it is totally wrong 
and contrary to an African environmental world if the source of ill-will and 
discord finds its root in the resources of the environment because by doing so, the 
environment is negative or destructive moral agent. 
Considerable literature has also been supplied in this discussion to show that 
Ubuntu is the springboard for African environmentalism. It has also been 
observed that, the ethical impact of Ubuntu can still be seen to have ecocentric 
implications. This is because the values it uphold when taken in its entirety, 
accommodates both human beings and inanimate components of nature. It shares 
in the universal essence contained in the African metaphysical and 
epistemological meaning of force or spirit which links up humans, animals, 
plants, and the so called inanimate. 
 Failure to uphold Ubuntu by the Shona people in Mukanganwi area in Masvingo 
Province, Zimbabwe has caused erratic rainfall in Mukanganwi over the past few 
decades. Human causes like deforestation and veld fires are significantly 
contributing to the climatic changes in the area. In fact it can be inferred that 
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reluctance on the deployment of Ubuntu in people’s relations with natural 
environment has compromised the rainfall pattern over the years. 
 To augment the claim that oral tradition has an important role in African people’s 
lives, it has also been noted that proverbs are an indigenous linguistic vehicle for 
environmental messages. Drawing examples from Yoruba and Ibos of Nigeria, it 
has been shown in chapter four that proverbs depict the relationship between 
human beings and nature. Proverbs as part of language conveys messages for 
environmental sanity. 
From the research one can deduce three aspects which are very significant. 
Firstly, African continent is facing serious ecological problems. Secondly, 
Western environmental ethical theories have not significantly solved 
environmental problems especially in Africa. Thirdly, the ethos of African 
communitarianism can supply the required ingredients in the formulation of an 
African environmental ethic that can direct efforts in grappling with 
environmental problems.  
It has been indicated in this research that it is possible to construct an 
environmental ethic anchored on African communitarianism. However, the 
researcher has realised that although African communitarianism embraces 
environmentalism, it has its own shortfalls. To begin with, African modern 
society has been largely influenced by acculturation, westernisation and 
globalisation. This has had an effect on the erosion of cultural values and mores 
that defines and identifies African people. As a result, the communitarian way of 
life is no longer pronounced as it used to be in the past. Therefore, constructing an 
environmental ethic based on African communitarianism alone without 
considering socio-cultural and religious nature of the modern day will be 
tantamount a negation of truth values and existential realities. 
On the same note, another elephant in the communitarian room is Christianity. 
Most African communities have been christianised. This is posing serious 
problems in the sense that, Christianity is replacing African traditional religious 
values. Most sacred mountains are no longer considered sacred. Sacred forests are 
being destroyed by people in search for timber for construction and firewood to 
mitigate acute electricity shortages. Furthermore, the ever-growing population in 
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African communities is putting too much pressure on African land as people 
hustle for accommodation and land for agrarian activities. Capitalists’ insatiable 
and rapacious desire for economic growth has not spared the sacred land. Both 
local and multinational companies in Africa are competing in clearing land for 
commercial mining and agriculture. In their pursuit of profit maximisation, these 
business corporations are contributing to environmental degradation in Africa. 
Sacred water sources such as pools and rivers have been subjected to agro-
chemicals which threaten aquatic life. Taboos which used to protect water sources 
are only read as part and parcel of history of pre-colonial African societies. 
Taboos are no longer shaping people’s encounter with nature in the contemporary 
African society. In modern Africa, people of the same totem are marrying each 
other. People are eating meat of their totemic animals. Poachers are killing 
animals of their totems.  A Zimbabwean news paper, The Sunday Mail of 1 
November 2015 has a story of 55 elephants which were killed by poachers using 
cyanide chemical in Hwange National Park. This is a clear sign of the gradual 
death of the belief in totemism. 
Another problem with African communitarianism when it comes to 
environmental issues is that, since it puts priority to the group rather than an 
individual, individuals who commit environmental crimes cannot be held 
accountable. In this contemporary African era where there is need for the crafting 
of stern environmental laws, individuals who cause serious harm to the 
environment should face the wrath of the law as individuals.  
Relying on African communitarianism in formulating an environmental ethic can 
have a challenge in the sense that the concept of totemism, which is part and 
parcel of African environmentalism, makes other animals more important than 
others. Totemic animals are considered reverential than those which are not 
totemic. This is problematic in the sense that animals which are not linked to 
totemism fall prey to human consumption. The same also applies to trees which 
are not considered sacred. Such trees are cut by people on daily basis for domestic 
purposes. This shows that African communitarianism is discriminative in nature 
and renders other species vulnerable. 
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Paying particular attention to the above discussion, especially on the drawbacks 
associated with the concept of African communitarianism, it is logical to argue 
that its authenticity in formulating a sound environmental ethic and strategy that 
can direct efforts in grappling with environmental trajectories becomes 
questionable. African communitarianism therefore needs to be re-branded, re-
defined and reconsidered to suit modern practical environmental dictates. African 
communitarianism therefore has to transcend itself and go beyond the banalities 
and barriers of African traditional religion, morality and Ubuntu to accommodate 
Christian ethics and scientific methods that concerns environmental conservation. 
Christianity and scientific methods should work together with African 
communitarianism if efforts to curb ecological problems are to yield tangible 
results.  
The researcher believes that since Christianity is one of the major religions in 
contemporary Africa, considering its tenets in formulating an environmental ethic 
would provide a practical solution to environmental problems. For instance in the 
Bible, it is chronicled in Genesis that at first, God created Adam and Eve and put 
them in the garden of Eden. It is evidenced in the Bible that the two were living in 
harmony with nature until they disobeyed God’s instruction and ate the forbidden 
fruit. This alone shows that the interdependence and interconnectedness of 
humans and nature is not a unique phenomena to traditional Africa. Furthermore, 
in Leviticus chapter 11 and Deuteronomy chapter 14, it is written that there are 
certain animals like pigs and rabbits which should not be eaten by Christians. 
Such animals are considered unclean. Given that Christianity has become one of 
the major religions in Africa, animals such as pigs and rabbits are safe from 
human consumption. In Ruth chapter 3, Boaz instructed his servants not to harvest 
everything from the fields but leave some grains for the poor and wild animals. 
This entails that Christian teachings embrace the welfare of non-human species. 
The above Biblical stories shows that Christian orthodox and doctrines have 
environmental concerns and should be incorporated in the formulation of a 
contemporary environmental ethics. 
Scientific environmental conservation methods cannot be ignored in the search for 
ideas that can assist in conserving the environment. In most African countries, 
organisations and other environmental players are embarking on scientific 
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methods of conserving the environment. In Zimbabwe for instance, the 
Environmental Management Agency (EMA) has adopted a Polluter Pays 
Principle strategy. This strategy entails that an industry or business entity that 
pollutes the environment should pay accordingly hence more pollution means 
more money to be paid. EMA has also made it a pre-requisite that any business 
organisation which intends to operate in Zimbabwe, be it in agriculture, mining 
and manufacturing should first satisfy the minimum requirements of 
Environmental and Social Impact Assessment. These requirements are stipulated 
in the Environmental Management Act. The main purpose of such environmental 
assessment is to see whether the proposed business enterprise has no negative 
impact on the environment and the society. 
 Scientific methods of environmental conservation, if used alongside African 
communitarianism and Christian ethics, can go a long way in curbing ecological 
problems. This integration will not only ensure environmental pragmatism, but 
will re-align the African communitarian principle with the realities of 
contemporary Africa. In addition, such integration will fulfil the much awaited 
and needed collaborative approach from various spheres to fight environmental 
problems. By accommodating Christian environmental ethos and scientific 
methods, African communitarianism guarantees its relevance in the intellectual 
market and avoids relegation into the academic dustbin. 
The researcher suggests that since the role of oral tradition has been replaced by 
classroom education, African learning institutions should make environmental 
ethics a compulsory course to all students regardless of which program one is 
undertaking. This will assist students to acquire environmental knowledge 
necessary for interpreting environmental problems affecting the continent and 
providing relevant solutions to curb the scourge. It’s a shame on the education 
system to produce Accountants, Lecturers, Lawyers, Teachers, Medical Doctors, 
Engineers, Human Resource Managers, Journalists and many other professionals 
who only work for the capitalist without advancing the environmental 
conservation agenda. Former South African President Nelson Mandela once said, 
“Education is the only tool a person can use to change this world.” In this case we 
are calling for environmental pedagogy for all. 
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The role of traditional chiefs in environmental conservation needs to be revisited 
in an endeavour to augment efforts to formulate a sustainable environmental ethic. 
In the traditional African society, traditional chiefs were the custodians and 
guardians of societal values including environmental protection. Chiefs could 
exercise their jurisdictional powers at traditional courts to convict and punish 
those who harm nature. Chiefs could also, after performing certain rituals, grant a 
person permission to enter a forest that was sacred. Such arrangements could 
make sure that forest animals, mountains and water sources are protected from 
negative human interference. It is however disturbing that in this contemporary 
era, the role of traditional chiefs has been greatly affected by western life. Most of 
the chiefs are now professionals with much of their time spend in urban areas. 
This leaves the rural folk without monitoring hence the room to destroy the 
environment is greatly increased. The role of traditional courts has been replaced 
by modern courts which are rocked daily by corruption. Traditional chiefs should 
be further empowered. In addition, the Traditional Chiefs Act of African countries 
should clearly stipulates that one is not allowed to be employed somewhere, 
somehow and anyhow if he or she is serving as a chief. This will give chiefs 
ample town to monitor their areas.  
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